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ABSTRACT 
In continuously administered employment tests, test security may be compromised by 
examinees revealing test items to future test candidates. Unlike academic testing, 
employee selection tests generally have longer test windows and are less likely to 
implement new test items or have multiple parallel forms for the sake of test security. 
Therefore, it is important to study whether test takers can benefit from item sharing, and 
whether integrity and personality inventories can explain such behaviors. Results showed 
that casual item sharing increased test scores relative to the control group, with small to 
moderate effect sizes. Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability were the best 
predictors, with conscientiousness more influential on numerical reasoning and 
Emotional Stability on verbal reasoning. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Item sharing refers to the sharing of previously administered test items among 
past and future test takers, such that future test takers may have the opportunity to benefit 
from such information, which is called item preknowledge. While item sharing may 
occur in academic and licensing exams and pose a threat to test security, the issue is 
particularly serious in employment testing, as continuous testing and unproctored Internet 
testing are frequently used in such situations. 
As many organizations hire job applicants on a rolling basis throughout the year, 
employment and selection tests are often administered on a continuing basis. 
Consequently, test items may be shared among past and future test takers. On the one 
hand, item preknowledge may help future job applicants to prepare themselves better for 
the employment test. They may become more familiar with the knowledge, skill, and 
abilities needed on the job, and therefore facilitate the process of matching applicants and 
jobs. On the other hand, such activities may compromise the integrity of the test and 
influence hiring decisions. As it takes considerable resources to develop alternate forms 
and equate them, employment batteries are often limited to a few forms or even just a 
single form. As a result, there can be considerable overlap in test items administered to 
past and future applicants, which increases the vulnerability of the testing program to 
compromise. 
In addition to giving selection tests in a continuous testing environment, more and 
more organizations utilize unproctored Internet testing as part of the selection process. 
Job applicants can complete the selection tests at any time and in any location, as long as 
there is an available Internet enabled computer (Tippins et al., 2006). If the stakes for the 
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employment or promotion are high and there are no serious consequences (e.g., being 
expelled from the organization), job applicants may be motivated to cheat, and 
unproctored Internet testing provides an opportunity to do so. Therefore, in a continuous 
unproctored Internet testing environment, items may be shared with little effort, and it is 
possible that test items can be compromised easily and quickly. 
 
Terminologies 
Prior empirical research on item sharing is almost non-exist and thus it may be 
useful to explore, define, and distinguish different terms related to compromised test 
items. I will first try to clarify and differentiate the concepts of test preparation, test score 
pollution, test coaching, and test compromise. 
Test preparation usually refers to preparation that increases a person’s knowledge 
in a defined domain that will later be tested (Clause, Delbridge, Schmitt, Chan, & 
Jennings, 2001). According to Haladyna, Nolen, and Haas (1991), there is a continuum of 
test preparation activities from ethical to highly unethical. Ethical activities include 
training in testwiseness skills, checking answer sheets, and increasing student motivation. 
In addition, developing a curriculum to match the test, and using commercial materials 
specifically designed to improve test performance could and should increase test scores 
and would be considered ethical test preparation. Other forms of test preparation are 
unethical. For example, it is improper to present items verbatim from the test to future 
test takers. This poses a huge threat to the validity and usefulness of test scores, because 
scores do not reflect a test taker’s knowledge of a domain, but rather reflect item 
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preknowledge. This later type of test preparation activity is considered a form of test 
score pollution. 
Test score pollution refers to factors affecting the truthfulness of a test score’s 
interpretation (Messick, 1984). As pollution influences test performance in a way that is 
unrelated to the construct measured by the test, the process can unfold before or during 
the actual test. One example of test score pollution during the actual test is answer 
copying, which is generally regarded as a form of cheating. Test score pollution can 
occur before the actual test, and such activities usually fall within the domain of test 
coaching. 
Test coaching is “intensive, concentrated drill or ‘cramming’ on sample test 
questions” (Anastasi, 1981). In order to perform well on the test, the purpose of test 
coaching is not to teach or train test takers on the content of the broad construct domains 
that the test attempts to measure (i.e., ethical test preparation). Quite the opposite, the 
focus is to allow future test takers to understand a very limited set of information that is 
covered by the test questions. While test coaching can refer to general test preparation 
that is related to testwiseness and “teaching to the test”, at the extreme, test coaching 
refers to simply getting answers to test questions. 
Item sharing is a specific, extreme form of test coaching. Here, test takers may 
obtain “item preknowledge” from previous test takers who disclosed previously 
administered items (McLeod, Lewis, & Thissen, 2003). Test takers may benefit from 
item sharing through information about questions and answers on a test, and may obtain a 
better test score. It is a form of unethical test preparation that may compromise the 
validity and integrity of the test quickly. 
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Test compromise is an important issue for test developers. To increase test 
security, test developers can increase the size of the item pool and replace or update the 
pool frequently such that it is less likely that the test will be compromised. However, such 
approaches may not be practical or cost-effective (Segall, 2004). Test compromise also 
affects the fairness among test takers. It is unfair for some examiners to have item 
preknowledge when others do not. 
To clarify, item sharing is an unethical activity of test preparation and one 
instance of test score pollution. Item sharing is also a specific, extreme form of test 
coaching, and is an example of test compromise. In a continuous testing environment, test 
coaching through the use of item preknowledge is one type of test compromise that is 
particularly likely to occur. For example, test compromise can arise from test takers 
sharing item content with a future test taker, or from an organized effort to reconstruct a 
bank of operational test questions, (Stocking, Ward, & Potenza, 1998). While test 
preparation activities are usually centered on learning the material to be tested, the 
extreme form of test coaching (e.g., item sharing) focuses on item preknowledge. 
This paper will first discuss the issue of test security in academic, licensing, and 
employee selection settings, followed by why it is important to consider test score 
pollution in terms of process. One approach to controlling test compromise, item 
exposure control, will be discussed. Then, prior research on test coaching will be 
reviewed in the context of employee selection. Those studies may help us better 
understand the influence of item sharing. 
As cognitive ability and personality inventories are often used for employment 
selection decisions (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), this study examined whether unorganized 
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item sharing may have an effect on test results. To understand the process of item 
sharing, personality inventories and covert integrity tests were used to see how each 
measure is related to benefiting from item sharing. It is hoped that in this casual, 
unorganized item sharing situation, we are able to see who is more likely to benefit from 
item sharing. 
 
Test security in academic setting 
Many tests used for academic admissions, such as the Graduate Record 
Examination (GRE) and Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT), are 
administered on a continuing basis. Examinees may take a test at varying times, and they 
may receive coaching about items that have been previously administered in the same 
testing window. Answers to such overlapping items are more likely to be memorized, 
which compromises test security. 
In academic testing, there have been several known breaches of test security. For 
instance, the Kaplan Education Centers were able to use 20 test takers to reconstruct a 
significant portion of the computer-based GRE (Honan, 1995). In 2002, the Educational 
Testing Service (ETS) found some Chinese and Korean websites offering questions from 
live exams of the computerized GRE. Those websites included both questions and 
answers that were obtained by previous test takers who memorized and reconstructed 
questions to share with other test takers. As a consequence, ETS made plans to introduce 
the Revised GRE in late 2007, which was designed to not only change the item types 
such that it would be more difficult to recall items, but also switch from an adaptive test 
to a linear test format. The Revised GRE was planned to only be administered on fixed 
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administration dates, limiting the possibility of item theft. Even though ETS eventually 
decided to scrap the Revised GRE, test security is clearly an important problem in 
continuous testing. 
There can be serious consequences if a test taker is found to be using one of the 
web sites that provide item preknowledge. In 2008, the Graduate Management Admission 
Council (GMAC) sued Scoretop.com for distributing copyrighted GMAT-related 
materials without GMAC's permission (Lavelle, 2008). GMAC was granted the site's 
domain name and said “any students found to have used the Scoretop site will have their 
test scores canceled, the schools that received them will be notified, and the student will 
not be permitted to take the test again”. While it is not certain what the MBA programs 
will do with applicants, current students, or even graduates who have used the site and 
information, it is clear that test compromise can have a great impact on test developers 
and test takers. 
 
Test security in licensing and certification 
Licensing and certification exams are given for many occupations and professions 
to ensure that candidates have mastered the necessary knowledge, skill, and ability to 
perform the job. While some licensing exams such as the Uniform Certified Public 
Accountancy Examination are administered on a continuing basis, many are given only a 
few times each year. For example, the National Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE) 
administers the Multistate Bar Examination (MBE) twice every year in several 
jurisdictions. The MBE is a 200-item multiple-choice exam, with only 50 new questions 
added each year (Law Student Journal, 2006). 
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Even though a test is only administered on fixed administration dates, test security 
can still be breached if items are reused or even if items are pretested by being embedded 
in operational forms: Test takers can engage in an organized item memorization scheme 
to compromise the item bank. For instance, in 2005, NCBE filed a federal law suit 
against Multistate Legal Studies Inc. (MLSI) for illegally copying questions from the 
Multistate Bar Exam for its test preparation course. The judge found that "evidence of 
copying practically leaps from the page", ruled in favor of the plaintiff (NCBE), and 
ordered MLSI to pay $11.9 million to NCBE (Duffy, 2006). 
In another case, Microsoft filed a law suit against Test King (Johnston, 2006). An 
unusual twist in the case was that Microsoft asked the Court to identify the people behind 
the site (the website is registered in the United Kingdom). Test King is one of many 
“braindump” web sites that reveal actual test items from certification exams, such as 
Microsoft Certified Systems Engineer (MCSE), Cisco Certified Network Associate 
(CCNA), Certified Information Systems Security Professionals (CISSP), etc. These web 
sites provide an interface that not only allows a test taker to submit items (a.k.a. brain 
dumps), but also vote for the best answer and provide a rationale for each option. In an 
empirical study, it was found that items posted on those web sites were “surprisingly 
accurate”, and most of the item bank was available after only in about 8 months (Smith, 
2004). 
Notice that the MBE and MCSE exam incidents are based on large scale item 
theft. That is, a company (e.g., MLSI, Test King) was engaged in organized activities to 
profit from test preparation materials, and the goal was to benefit many future test takers. 
These large scale operations to compromise a test may be more likely to be detected by 
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test developers, and copyright infringement suits can be filed against test preparation 
companies or web sites. However, if such conspiracy is small scale and the aim is to 
benefit a small group of people, it is difficult to identify test takers who posted 
memorized items or benefited from the posted items. 
A recent incident at University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey 
illustrates how small scale test compromise conspiracies work. A number of students at 
the dental school organized a “clandestine operation to cull questions from the exams” 
(Sherman & Margolin, 2007). They instructed other members of the class to memorize 
specified questions and to contribute questions that might be included on future exams. 
The directions included setting up e-mail accounts under false names, posting the items 
on a web site, and giving the composite exams as a gift to the next year's class. If 
participating members can keep such operations secret, it is difficult to detect this type of 
small scale test compromise. 
 
Test security in employee selection 
Many companies utilize standardized test batteries, and test scores often play an 
important part in hiring and promotion decisions. For instance, predictors of job 
performance, such as general cognitive ability and personality inventories, are often used 
for employment selection decisions (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; Murphy, 2002). While 
human resources departments utilize other assessment tools such as job interviews and 
background information to make hiring decisions, if a job applicant did not perform well 
enough on a selection test to be considered among the top applicants, the person may not 
even have a chance to be invited to a job interview. Thus, job applicants may be 
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motivated to engage in activities that can cause test score pollution. Prior research has 
found cheating in many fields, including pilots, marines, cosmetologists, teachers, police 
officers, and even clergy (Cizek, 1999). 
In academic testing, a particular form of a test or an item pool may be in use for as 
little as one month or less. Here, the chance of items being memorized and exposed is 
lower. Organizations such as the College Board and ETS collect test registration fees to 
not only perform test equating and generate score reports, but also recover the costs of 
developing new forms of the tests. However, in employee selection, job applicants do not 
pay a fee for testing. As the costs to develop and administer tests are not covered by job 
applicants, companies are less likely to create new selection test items. Therefore, the test 
windows are usually longer, item pool sizes are smaller, and item rotation is less frequent. 
All of these factors may affect test security. 
In addition, many companies are moving towards unproctored Internet testing to 
reduce costs and better accommodate their hiring needs. As the top three reasons for 
companies to use technologies in recruiting, screening, and selection processes are 
increased efficiency, availability of new assessment tools, and reduced cost (Chapman 
&Webster, 2003), unproctored Internet testing has several advantages over traditional 
proctored test administrations for both test administrators and job applicants. For instance, 
the company no longer needs to schedule job applicants on-site for in-person test sessions 
(Wheeler, Foss, & Handler, 2001), and the test content can be updated more frequently. 
Job applicants’ responses are centralized and collected faster with fewer human mistakes 
(Beaty, Fallon, Shepherd, & Barrett, 2002). While some previous research has shown 
measurement equivalence across proctored and unproctored Internet testing in field and 
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lab studies (Do, Shepherd, & Drasgow, 2005), it should be noted that there were test 
score differences, and test compromise may cause a selection test to become invalid and 
useless. In such cases, companies may have to use other, more costly tools to select 
employees. Therefore, it is important to study test security and test score pollution in the 
context of employee selection. 
 
Process of test score pollution 
As mentioned previously, test score pollution can unfold before or during the 
actual test. Test score pollution during the actual test is generally regarded as cheating, 
and is often studied in terms of academic dishonesty (Jensen, Arnett, Feldman, & 
Cauffman, 2002) or academic integrity (Chapman, Davis, Toy, & Wright, 2004). For 
example, previous research has suggested that cheating during college ranges from 3% of 
students (Karlins, Michaels, & Podlogar, 1988) to 87% (McCabe, 1992). While this wide 
range may reflect confusion about what cheating is and may be overestimated due to peer 
pressure or researcher expectations (Chapman et al., 2004), it is nonetheless clear that 
cheating does occur in proctored settings. One interesting finding is that 57% of students 
would look at another student's exam during a test, but only 12% would change their 
answers (Nonis & Swift, 1998). This means answer copying during a test may reflect 
different processes from using item preknowledge obtained from other test takers prior to 
the test. 
Some work has already been conducted to understand the characteristics of people 
who cheat on tests (Whitley, 1998) and why they cheat (Smith, Ryan, & Diggins, 1972; 
Baird, 1980; Stevens & Stevens, 1987). For instance, it has been found that students who 
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are high in achievement motivation are more likely to cheat (Johnson, 1981; Eisenberger 
& Shank, 1985). Prior research also found lenient attitudes toward cheating are positively 
related to tolerance of deviance, and negatively related to self-restraint (Jensen et al., 
2002). 
Nonetheless, these studies have not attempted to understand and address how test 
score pollution can occur before the actual test. Historically, this has not been a key issue 
because there is a myriad of ways to cheat. Thus, instead of studying test score pollution 
in terms of people’s attitudes and opinions toward cheating, we propose to examine test 
security and test score pollution issues in terms of process. The process consists of three 
stage, item memorization, item preknowledge, and item responding during the actual 
testing. 
Item memorization. Test score pollution may start with item memorization by 
previous test takers, also known as sources. Sources memorize the items they are 
presented and provide information about items to other test takers, known as 
beneficiaries. 
Item preknowledge. The beneficiaries may then acquire the information from the 
sources, called item preknowledge. For this information to be most useful, the 
beneficiaries need to take the test during the same test window as the source. When test 
items in a test window are selected from a single item pool, the beneficiaries may gain an 
unfair advantage over other test takers. 
Item responding during testing. Finally, during the actual testing, the beneficiaries 
utilize their item preknowledge to answer some items. While answer copying may be 
prevented in a proctored setting, a test proctor has no way at knowing if an examiner is 
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utilizing item preknowledge. 
As the process of test score pollution may start before the test is administered to a 
beneficiary, prior research has taken at least two approaches to understanding test 
security: item exposure algorithms, and simulations based on item preknowledge states. 
While each approach has its merits and has important practical implications, each has its 
shortcomings as well. 
 
Item exposure control algorithms 
The most frequently used psychometric method to reduce the impact of item 
preknowledge on computerized adaptive tests (CATs) is to use item exposure control 
methods, such that items with the greatest psychometric information will not be selected 
too frequently and thus quickly compromised. There are several exposure control 
methods that can be used, including McBride and Martin’s (MM) technique (McBride & 
Martin, 1983), the Sympson-Hetter (SH) procedure (Hetter & Sympson, 1997; Sympson 
& Hetter, 1985), the Davey and Parshall (DP) methodology (Davey & Parshall, 1995; 
Parshall, Davey, & Nering, 1998), and the Stocking and Lewis unconditional multinomial 
(SL) and conditional multinomial (SLC) procedure (Stocking & Lewis, 1998). There are 
also approaches to increase item pool utilization and therefore reduce item exposure rate, 
such as the a-stratified (Chang & Ying, 1999) and a-stratified with b blocking (Chang, 
Qian, & Ying, 2001) methods. 
While previous research has compared some of the item exposure control 
strategies, in practice, if items are exposed, memorized, and provided to future test takers, 
item exposure control may be inefficient in some circumstances. If organizations do not 
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have large item banks or utilize multiple forms in unproctored Internet testing, any item 
exposure control method will be limited in effectiveness. 
 
Simulation studies based on item preknowledge states 
Simulation studies have been used to examine test security by simulating test 
compromise on a certain percentage of items. For example, Stocking, Ward, and Potenza 
(1998) used the weighted deviations model (WDM) adaptive testing paradigm to simulate 
a worst case scenario: with 10% or 20% of the item pool compromised, they assumed that 
all test takers would have perfectly correct performance on all disclosed items they 
encounter. They found that with 10% of the items compromised, the increases in test 
scores may be rather small, but if 20% of the item pool is disclosed, the effects may be 
large enough to have practical consequences. 
Another approach assumes the item preknowledge state is dichotomous, where an 
item is either completely compromised or not. McLeod, Lewis, and Thissen (2003) 
proposed a modified 3PL model, where the probability of a correct response to an item is 
the combination of the test taker’s underlying proficiency (without) preknowledge of the 
specific item, and the probability of answering the item correctly based on the test taker’s 
preknowledge of the item. They proposed a Bayesian posterior log odds ratio index to 
detect the use of item preknowledge. 
While both of these approaches are promising, assuming that 10% of items are 
compromised or modeling item preknowledge states dichotomously may be an 
oversimplification. On the one hand, with organized item theft, actual item compromise 
rates may be much higher than 10%. For instance, each 200-item Multistate Bar Exam 
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(MBE) administration includes about 60 questions from earlier tests (Nathan, 2006), 
which means about 30% of the items were compromised before the test was given. On 
the other hand, with unorganized test coaching, previous test takers may imperfectly 
describe items and consequently fail to help cheaters. Here, a dichotomous item 
preknowledge state may not be the best way to describe how test coaching effects test 
performance.  
Item sharing obviously may improve a test taker’s performance, but it may also 
impair performance. This distinction turns on whether the exposed item was 
compromised with the correct answer or an erroneous response. Unless each and every 
source has extremely high ability and very good memorization skills, the information 
provided by them will include both correct and erroneous responses. As the information 
shared may contain only partial information about the test items and options, it may be 
difficult for the beneficiaries to determine whether the information is accurate or 
incorrect. While correct answers will help beneficiaries, if the beneficiaries receive 
erroneous answers, their score may actually be lowered. 
 
Test coaching in employee selection 
 No empirical study has been conducted on item sharing in the employee selection 
setting. One major distinction between academic testing and employee selection test 
preparation is that job applicants may consider whether spending many hours learning 
about broad domains of job knowledge is worth it or not. While job applicants may spend 
a great deal of time studying a general content domain, if specific item preknowledge was 
available and there is no serious consequences preventing them to benefit from item 
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sharing, they may be willing to spend a small amount of time reviewing items they 
obtained from previous applicants. Therefore, the characteristics of a smaller conspiracy 
focusing on the benefiting from item sharing should be examined. 
 One approach to examining test coaching in employee selection settings is to 
investigate whether retaking identical selection tests results in significant test score 
increases between the first and second or further test administrations. In this scenario, 
candidates obtain preknowledge through the first test administration. Hausknecht, Trevor, 
and Farr (2002) studied 4726 candidates who took the same annual verbal cognitive 
ability test and oral communication ability test two or more times. They found 
statistically significant score increases, regardless of the number of tests taken. They also 
found the number of tests taken was positively related to training performance, and 
negatively related to turnover. While they did find practice effects, it is difficult to tell 
whether the effect was due to test familiarity, decreased test anxiety and stress, or actual 
ability increases. As the validity coefficient was significantly smaller for repeat test 
takers, it is possible that applicants learned specific item content that produced higher test 
scores, yet did not actually improve on the underlying construct presumed to predict 
performance. 
 The above example illustrates why it is important to study item preknowledge. 
When the identical selection test is administered to the same person two or more times, 
those test takers have item preknowledge and score significantly higher upon retesting. 
Similarly, if item preknowledge was provided to prospective job applicants, it is possible 
that their test scores would increase significantly, and reduce the validity of the test. 
However, as item sharing may improve or impair a test taker’s performance, the amount 
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of benefiting from item sharing may depend on various factors such as the test taker’s 
personal characteristics.  
Unfortunately, there is no known study examining item sharing in terms of 
employee selection settings. A recent review by Sackett, Borneman, and Connelly (2008) 
showed that test coaching was studied primary in the educational admissions domain, 
particularly the SAT. While test coaching on the SAT may produce 0.1 standard 
deviation increases in scores, Kulik, Bangert-Drowns, and Kulik (1984) have found 
greater score increases for other intelligence and aptitude tests. In addition, while job 
applicants who retake identical selection tests showed significant test score increases, the 
specific mechanisms underlying score improvement are unknown. Therefore, it is 
important to examine the process underlying score gain from item sharing. 
The next section describes mechanisms that may underlie benefiting from item 
sharing. 
 
Theory of planned behavior (TPB) 
Why would test takers benefit from item sharing? The theory of planned behavior 
(Ajzen, 1991) argued that individuals make decisions to engage in specific behavior as a 
function of three components: behavior beliefs and their valences, normative beliefs and 
subjective norms, and control beliefs and perceived behavior control. Based on their own 
beliefs about the specific behavior and the expectation of a positive outcome after having 
engaged in the behavior, they are more likely to perform the specific behavior. Beck and 
Ajzen (1991) have found the model was able to predict most of the systematic variance in 
student decisions to cheat. 
 17 
As item sharing may improve or impair a test taker’s performance, the amount of 
benefiting from item sharing may depend on various factors such as the test taker’s 
personal characteristics. In the next section, I will use TPB to explain how each 
personality factor may be used to explain why the test taker may benefit from item 
sharing. Here, the three major components of TPB will be described first and examples 
will be provided to show how each component may be related to item sharing. 
Behavior beliefs and attitude toward the behavior. 
First, the test taker may utilize behavior beliefs, which is the subjective belief that 
the particular behavior will produce a given outcome. In this study, a test taker may first 
believe that item sharing will produce a given outcome, which is increased test 
performance. Once such a behavior belief is established, the test taker will need to 
evaluate whether the behavior belief is positive or negative. If the valences of benefiting 
from item preknowledge is positive, the test taker is more likely to engage in item sharing. 
If the valence is negative, then the test taker is less likely to engage in item sharing. 
An example of evaluating behavior beliefs as positive or negative may be 
illustrated to explain why some students would look at another student's exam during a 
test (Nonis & Swift, 1998). Here, looking at another student's exam might be expected to 
produce a given outcome, which is an increased test score. If their valence toward such an 
outcome is positive, they are more likely to look at another student’s answer. 
Normative beliefs and subjective norm. 
The second component of TPB is normative belief, the individual’s perception 
about the particular behavior judged by the person’s referent others such as classmates, 
friends, and family members. These normative beliefs, with the motivation to comply 
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with others, determine the prevailing subjective norm, which is the perceived social 
pressure to engage or not to engage in a behavior. A test taker may perceive item sharing 
as socially acceptable. For example, whether item sharing is considered ethical or 
unethical by significant others, and the motivation to comply with these others will 
influence the focal individual’s behavior. 
When the test taker evaluates the suggested behavior (i.e., item sharing) as 
positive and the subjective norms encourage the test taker to perform such behaviors, s/he 
is more likely to do so. Indeed, many users of Scoretop.com argued that they thought the 
site's questions were legitimate (Levy, 2008) and that “Nowhere in the Web site does it 
say you would be violating the rules”. 
Control beliefs and perceived behavior control. 
Finally, control beliefs assess factors that may facilitate or impede performance of 
the behavior. With several control beliefs, the person may develop perceived behavioral 
control, which is the test taker’s evaluation of how easy or difficult it is to perform the 
particular behavior. With the help of Internet and search engines, access to test 
information is much easier than word-of-mouth. Some users on web sites such as 
PostYourTest.com believe that “making them available to everyone may level out the 
playing field,” and doing so facilitates perceived behavioral control (Veroff, 2008). 
To sum up, behavioral beliefs link the behavior of interest (item sharing) to 
expected outcomes (increased test performance). The test taker may use normative beliefs 
to evaluate whether item sharing is positive or negative. When factors present (e.g., item 
preknowledge) to facilitate the performance of the behavior, test takers may develop 
perceptions of behavioral control between item sharing and test performance. A test 
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taker’s intention to benefit from item sharing is based on the positive attitude toward the 
behavior, favorable subjective norm, and the perceived behavioral control of factors that 
facilitate the behavior of interest.  
The theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) is one of the most influential 
theories to link intention and behavior. Meta-analytic research has found the theory can 
account for about 50% of the variance in intention in self-report surveys, and 20% of the 
variance of observed behavior (Armitage & Conner, 2001). Prior research on unethical 
behavior of engineering and humanities students has showed that the TPB model was 
able to predict cheating regardless of context such as gender, discipline, and high school 
(Harding, Mayhew, Finelli, & Carpenter, 2007). As many studies have been conducted 
and provide strong support for the theory, this study will not test the theory of planned 
behavior itself. We are not interested in measuring the test taker’s subjective evaluation 
of item sharing, subjective norms about item sharing, or the perceived behavioral control 
of factors that facilitate the behavior. Rather, the theory is used to provide a rationale to 
explain why several personal characteristic may influence test takers to item sharing 
behavior. 
While it may be possible to ask test takers about their behavior beliefs and 
attitudes, their normative beliefs and subjective norms, as well as their control beliefs and 
perceived behavioral control toward benefiting from item sharing, it is unlikely that such 
questions will be present in an employee selection situation. These direct questions may 
not be job related and improper to use as part of the selection hurdle. Instead, 
organizations may utilize valid predictors of job performance such as personality and 
integrity tests as a proxy to such sensitive questions. Given that personality and integrity 
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items are frequently used during the hiring process, it may be possible to use these 
variables to explain item sharing. 
 
Using personality to explain benefiting from item sharing 
The Big Five model provides a widely accepted taxonomy for personality trait 
variables. It includes Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Neuroticism (or 
Emotional Stability), and Openness to Experience. While some have argued that the Big 
Five model is not comprehensive enough, and its constructs are confounded, Barrick and 
Mount’s (1991) meta-analysis showed that the Big Five personality dimensions are valid 
predictors of job performance in some circumstances. Poropat (2009) argued that 
personality is a component of an individual’s willingness to perform and may be used to 
predict socially valued behaviors. As such, we are not concerned about prior research 
(Schmit & Ryan, 1993; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999; Alliger & Dwight, 2000) on the 
susceptibility of personality measures to faking. In the present study, personality 
dimensions are used as explanatory variables, not dependent variables. Specifically, we 
are not interested in the attitude or opinions of test takers toward item sharing. We are 
interested in what personality dimensions are related to the degree a person may engage 
in item sharing and hence benefit. In other words, the study examines whether benefiting 
from item sharing can be explained though personality dimensions. 
To begin with, it is possible that different personality dimensions will have 
different magnitudes of relationship with the degree a person may be benefit from item 
sharing. The remainder of this section will provide a rationale on how personality may be 
related to benefiting from item sharing. 
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Extraversion. 
People who are extraverted are more likely to be assertive and enthusiastic, and 
they enjoy interpersonal interaction and engage in community activities. They are often 
motivated by reward or success, compared to introverts who are primarily motivated to 
avoid punishment and failure (Dodson, 2000). Instead of being reserved and depressed, 
they express their energy and tend to be sociable, dominant, and positive (Watson & 
Clark, 1997). As such, one might expect that highly extraverted people will perform 
relatively well in learning contexts. However, reviews by De Raad and Schouwenburg 
(1996) showed that extraverted students were only superior to introverted students at 
school before the age of 11-12, and successful university students usually score low on 
extraversion. 
Nonetheless, according to Barrick and Mount (1991), extraversion is a valid 
predictor for managers and sales representatives (ρ = .18 and .15, respectively). 
Extraversion was also a significant predictor of training proficiency (ρ = .26). With 
regards to the relationship between extraversion and motivation, Judge and Ilies (2002) 
found a moderate relationship with self-efficacy motivation (ρ = .33) and low correlations 
with goal-setting motivation and expectancy motivation (ρ = .15 and .10, respectively). 
Based on the above correlations, it is possible to infer the relationship between 
extraversion and benefiting from item sharing through motivation and managerial 
performance in a team environment where training is used. Prior research showed that 
team members who are extraverted are more likely to seek help from other team members 
(Porter, Hollenback, Ilgen, Ellis, West, & Moon, 2003). As test coaching can be 
considered one type of training, the effectiveness of using item preknowledge may 
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depends on one’s motivation. As such, people who are extraverted may be motivated to 
seek help from others. 
However, while extraverted people are motivated to seek help from others, it does 
not mean they are necessary open to receiving help from others. Prior research showed 
that the correlation between extraversion and motivation was strongest for self-efficacy 
motivation (Judge & Ilies, 2002). As people with strong perceived self-efficacy are more 
likely to believe in their own capabilities to reach designated levels of performance 
(Bandura, 1994), it is possible that they may consider any benefits from item sharing to 
be inferior to what they might do based on their own ability, and render the relationships 
between extraversion and benefiting from item sharing to be weak. 
Using the theory of planned behavior, it is possible that people who are 
extraverted are enthusiastic and believe that item sharing will produce a given outcome, 
which is increased test performance. As extraverts are more assertive than introverts, they 
may perceive benefiting from item sharing as positive. Given that their attitude toward 
benefiting from item preknowledge is positive, they may be more likely to engage in  
item sharing. 
With regards to the second component of TPB, normative belief, it is possible that 
extraverts evaluate the judgment of significant others about benefiting from item sharing 
the same way as themselves. In a study on extraversion and psychological closeness, 
Beck and Cartwright (1998) found that more extraverted people were more likely to 
assume that other people were similar to themselves. As such, people who are extravert 
may perceive item sharing as socially acceptable, and believe it is a legitimate way to 
improve test performance.  
 23 
Given that extraversion has a low yet significant correlation with training 
proficiency, and a moderate relationship with self-efficacy motivation yet low correlation 
with goal-setting motivation and expectancy motivation, it seems necessary to examine 
the relationship between extraversion and benefiting from item sharing in an empirical 
study. 
Conscientiousness. 
Although conscientiousness may be conceptualized as a single construct, it 
includes various subcomponents such as competence, order, dutifulness, achievement 
striving, self-discipline, deliberation (Robertson, Baron, Gibbons, MacIver, & Nyfield, 
2000). Conscientiousness people are usually hardworking and goal oriented. They are 
usually motivated and achievement oriented (Barrick & Mount, 1991). Using the theory 
of planned behavior, as people who are conscientiousness are goal oriented and motivated 
to perform well, they may believe that item sharing can produce a given outcome, which 
is increased test performance. Among the Big Five personality dimensions, prior research 
has showed that only the conscientiousness dimension was found to be consistently 
related to intentions and behavior (Conner & Abraham, 2001). As such, it is possible that 
people who are conscientiousness could engage in item sharing and obtain higher test 
scores. 
How will conscientiousness people evaluate item sharing as positive or negative? 
Stober (2001) developed a social desirability scale and correlate the inventory with the 
NEO Five Factor Inventory (FFI) (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Among the five factors, 
conscientiousness has the highest correlation with social desirability. In other words, 
conscientiousness people who view item sharing as positive may also believe that such 
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behavior is socially acceptable by others. With normative beliefs to comply with others, 
their subjective norms and perceived social support help the conscientious test taker to 
engage in the behavior, which is engaging in item sharing. When the test taker evaluates 
the suggested behavior (i.e., item sharing) as positive and socially desirable, the test taker 
is encouraged and more likely to to perform such behavior.  
The last component of TPB involves control beliefs, which are factors that may 
facilitate or impede the performance of the behavior. If item preknowledge is not difficult 
to obtain and the evaluation of item sharing is easy, the test taker will have perceived 
behavioral control. Given the consistency between behavior beliefs, normative beliefs, 
and control beliefs, conscientiousness could be the best predictor of benefiting from item 
sharing. 
Agreeableness. 
People who are agreeable tend to be considerate, trusting, friendly, and better at 
interpersonal facilitation (Hurtz & Donovan, 2000). They are more likely to cooperate 
with people and be compassionate to help out others. Meta-analysis (Barrick & Mount, 
1991) results show that the correlation between agreeableness and job performance is 
small (ρ < .10). In another meta-analysis (Judge & Ilies, 2002) on agreeableness and three 
types of motivation, except for a moderate correlation with goal-setting motivation (ρ = -
.29), the correlations with expectancy motivation and self-efficacy motivation were small 
(ρ < .13). As such, it is questionable whether people who are agreeable will be highly 
motivated to perform well. 
Can we predict benefiting from item sharing from agreeableness? It is hard to say. 
On the one hand, prior research has shown that agreeableness may have some positive 
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impact on academic performance by facilitating cooperation with learning processes (De 
Raad & Schouwenburg, 1996). As people who are agreeable are more trusting and 
cooperative, they could perceive item preknowledge as truth and accept it to help their 
test performance.  
On the other hand, accepting help in the case of agreeableness is not the same as 
actively seeking help that might be expected from people who are extraverts. Prior 
research has shown that the relationship between agreeableness and organizational 
citizenship behaviors is weak (Organ & McFall, 2004), meaning that agreeable people 
may not actively engage in discretionary behavior such as item sharing. In addition, while 
agreeableness is correlated with goal-setting motivation (ρ = -.29), it was a negative 
correlation (Judge & Ilies, 2002), meaning agreeable people may not be motivated to 
engage in item sharing. 
We may use the framework of the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) to 
explain how agreeable people will react when they are exposed to item preknowledge. As 
agreeable people are more trusting with others, their behavioral belief may expect item 
sharing to produce a desirable outcome, namely improved test performance. When they 
evaluate whether such behavior as positive or negative, their cooperative tendencies may 
result in evaluations of such behavior as positive. 
When normative beliefs are considered by agreeable people, given their tendency 
to agree and cooperate may lead to perception that item sharing is socially acceptable. In 
other words, item sharing is cooperating with others. As such, they may be more likely to 
accept the item preknowledge provided and engage in item sharing. 
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The third component of TPB is about beliefs concerning factors that may facilitate 
or impede performance of the behavior. When item preknowledge is presented to people 
who are agreeable, they may develop perceptions of higher self-efficacy. Given the 
consistency between behavior beliefs, normative beliefs, and control beliefs, 
agreeableness could also predict item sharing and consequent score increases. 
However, in a meta-analysis examining the relationships of personality 
dimensions to performance motivation (Judge & Ilies, 2002), unlike conscientiousness 
that is positively correlated with all three types of motivation, agreeableness was only 
weakly or even negatively correlated with performance motivation. This could indicate 
that the degree of item sharing explained by agreeableness will be much smaller than 
what can be predicted through conscientiousness. As such, it is uncertain whether 
agreeableness will predict item sharing and score increases. 
Neuroticism. 
Individuals who are neurotic are more likely to experience negative emotions such 
as anxiety, anger, and depression. They may respond poorly to stress and have difficulty 
controling emotions. As people who are neurotic are more anxious and tend to focus on 
their emotional state, their academic performance is usually reduced due to interference 
(De Raad & Schouwenburg, 1996). Neuroticism is also a dispositional driver of 
employee attitudes, affect, and behavior (Judge, Van Vianen, & De Pater, 2004). Prior 
research using a numerical reasoning test showed that in a stressful situation, neurotic 
individuals performed significantly less well than stable individuals, while in a less 
stressful, relaxed condition, there was no significant score difference between neurotic 
and stable participants (Dobson, 2000).  
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On the opposite end of the construct, people who are emotionally stable are 
usually calm and secure. Emotional Stability is positively associated with self-efficacy 
(Judge & Bono, 2002), and self-efficacy is considered to be a strong predictor of grade 
point average (Robbins, Lauver, Le, Davis, Langley, & Carlstrom, 2004). Emotional 
Stability generally contributes positively to performance (Mount, Barrick, & Stewart, 
1998). 
By applying the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991), it can be argued that 
test takers who are emotionally stable may first believe that item sharing will produce a 
given outcome, which is increased test performance. When they evaluate whether such 
behavior is positive or negative, they may perceive benefiting from item sharing as 
positive because doing so is consistent with their tendency to perceive the world in a way 
evolves little stress and anxiety. 
With regard to the second component of TPB, normative beliefs, emotionally 
stable individuals may consider benefiting from item sharing as acceptable from referent 
others, as usually people do not consider item preknowledge as a way of cheating. When 
the test taker evaluates benefiting from item sharing as positive and the perceived 
subjective norms seems to indicate the behavior is socially acceptable, s/he is encouraged 
to perform such behavior and more likely to benefit from item sharing. 
Finally, emotionally stable people are less likely to experience negative feelings 
and anxiety, and more able to maintain stable emotional adjustment (McCrae & Costa, 
1996). As such, when they assess the factors that may facilitate or impede performance of 
the behavior, they may perceive greater control over their test performance. As a result, 
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their control beliefs may regard item preknowledge as a way to improve their test 
performance, and thereby benefit from item sharing. 
Openness to experience. 
According to Costa and McCrae (1992), elements of openness to experience 
include fantasy, aesthetics, feelings, actions, ideas, and values. People who are open to 
experience are usually more creative and unconventional (McCrae, 1996). They are more 
likely to be attentive, imaginative, and possess intellectual curiosity (Costa & McCrae, 
1992).  
According to Barrick and Mount (1991), individuals high in openness to 
experience have more positive attitudes towards learning new things and are more likely 
to engage in learning experiences. De Raad and Schouwenburg (1996) also argued that 
openness to experience seems to reflect “the idea student” because of the relationship 
with foresighted, intelligent, and resourceful. 
Given the above mentioned findings, it is possible that people who are open to 
experience may consider item preknowledge to be novel and interesting. However, 
whether openness to experience can translate to improved test performance is 
questionable. While prior research showed openness to experience is a valid predictor of 
training proficiency (ρ = .25), the predictive relationship with job performance is rather 
weak (Barrick & Mount, 1991). Thus, the question whether they will benefit from item 
sharing should be addressed empirically. 
In addition, openness to experience is probably the least studied construct in the 
Big Five Model of personality. When the correlation between openness to experience and 
motivation is considered, the relationship is small and inconsistent: ρ = .18 for goal-
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setting motivation, ρ = -.08 for expectancy motivation, and ρ = .20 for self-efficacy 
motivation (Judge & Ilies, 2002). As such, it is uncertain whether people who are open to 
experience may be motivated to benefit from item sharing. 
How will people who are open to experience perceive the normative beliefs from 
significant others with regards to item preknowledge and item sharing? It’s hard to say. 
On the one hand, those relevant others may be accustomed to the innovative and 
imaginative thinking about the individual who is open to experience, and agree with the 
individual’s ideas, values, actions, and feelings. On the other hand, the individual may 
have already experienced the negative feedback from significant others about his/her 
novel behaviors. Thus, it is difficult to evaluate the perceived social pressure to engage or 
not to engage in item sharing. Therefore, it is uncertain whether openness to experience 
will be a good predictor of item sharing. 
 
Using integrity scales to explain benefiting from item sharing 
Personality based integrity tests are usually correlated with conscientiousness, 
agreeableness, and emotional stability (Berry, Sackett, & Wiemann, 2007). They are 
considered to be “compound traits (Hough & Schneider, 1996)” such that the 
combination of basic traits is able to predict a specific criterion in specific contexts and 
achieve higher criterion-related validity. As a result, they are considered to be “criterion-
focused” such that items are designed to predict a criterion, such as counterproductive 
behavior (Berry, Sackett, & Wiemann, 2007). Here, again, we examine integrity as an 
explanatory variable for predicting benefiting from item sharing. 
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Will covert integrity tests be more likely to explain benefiting from item sharing 
than personality scales? It is hard to say, because people may consider the use of item 
preknowledge differently. Some may consider it is unethical to use item preknowledge 
and wrong to be benefiting from item sharing to help themselves, but others may think 
item preknowledge helps to prepare themselves to perform well and present themselves 
as ideal employees and that has nothing to do with one’s integrity. As such, it may be 
necessary to examine whether personality based integrity measures may be able to 
explain a specific behavior, benefiting from item sharing. 
 
Test taker motivation 
In Campbell’s basic model of job performance (Campbell, 1990), job 
performance is determined by declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge and skill, 
and motivation. As such, it is possible that the test taker’s motivation may influence the 
effect of item sharing. According to Salgado, Remeseiro, and Iglesias (1996), test-taking 
motivation can be defined as the positive or negative attitudes for answering the tests. 
Prior research has found that with test taker ability controlled, job applicants showed 
higher test-taking motivation than actual employees (Arvey, Strickland, Drauden, & 
Martin, 1990). Test takers may also consider themselves differently when responding to 
the same assessment labeled for personnel assessment versus anonymous assessment for 
research (Schmit & Ryan, 1993). However, it is uncertain whether test taking motivation 
may be different between test takers with or without item preknowledge. 
In high stakes testing, test takers may be motivated to engage in test score 
pollution activities such as copying answers from other test takers or even asking more 
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knowledgeable colleagues or friends to take the test. If the stakes of the testing are not 
considered high, they are less likely to engage in those unethical activities. However, if 
item preknowedge is presented to test takers, test takers with different degrees of 
motivation may have different responses. Therefore, motivational factors concerning 
benefiting from item sharing could be studied. 
It should be noted that there are correlations among the Big Five personality 
dimensions and test-taking motivation. In an empirical study, Salgado, Remeseiro, and 
Iglesias (1996) found Neuroticism and Agreeableness were significantly correlated with 
test anxiety and poor control (r=.37 and .17, respectively), and Extraversion and 
Conscientiousness were significantly correlated with motivation and confidence in tests 
(r =.16 and .17, respectively). When performance motivation in general is concerned, 
Judge and Ilies (2002) found Extraversion and Openness to Experience were significant 
predictors of goal-setting and self-efficacy motivation, Conscientiousness was a 
significant predictor of performance motivation across the three motivational perspectives, 
Agreeableness was a significant negative predictor of goal-setting motivation, and 
Neuroticism was moderately negatively correlated with performance motivation. They 
found the average multiple correlations between the five-factor model and performance 
motivation was .49. This indicates that a substantial percentage of test taker motivation 
can be explained by personality dimensions. 
However, it should be noted that in personnel assessment situations, test takers 
may be motivated to present themselves as ideal candidates and bias their answers to self-
report measures of motivation (Salgado, Remeseiro, & Iglesias, 1996). Such distortion 
may be related to positive test taker motivation, but it is questionable how test taker 
 32 
motivation can be translated into performance motivation such as goal-setting motivation, 
expectancy motivation, and self-efficacy motivation. As such, test taker motivation will 
not be used as part of the independent variables, but as a manipulation check to see 
whether test takers may have different levels of test-taking motivation given the presence 
or absence of item preknowledge. 
 
Effects of item sharing: Cognitive constructs 
It is not clear that item sharing will increase score equally across different 
cognitive abilities. While there are several types of cognitive ability measures, reasoning 
was selected in this study for its frequent usage in academic and occupational testing. As 
reasoning can be expressed in various contexts such as numerical, verbal, pictorial, or 
spatial, the study will use two facets of reasoning, numerical and verbal. Thus, measures 
of these two facets will be used to examine the effects of item sharing. 
Numerical reasoning. 
The Numerical Reasoning test (CareerHarmony, 2003) asks test takers to examine 
a series of numbers arranged according to a certain rule. A sample item looks like: 
5,    7,    14,    16,    32,    34,    68 
Then test takers are asked to choose among a set of 5 possible options to determine which 
option whose corresponding number best continues the series.  
Numerical reasoning relies on strategies for determining computational rules, and 
there is no need to memorize numbers in order to solve the questions. As far as test 
coaching is concerned, if the strategy for finding the rule has been disclosed through 
information exchange and item sharing, test performance will likely be improved from 
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the baseline condition. Therefore, the influence of general test coaching (e.g., strategy) 
could be greater than obtaining specific item preknowledge in benefiting from item 
sharing. 
Verbal reasoning. 
The Verbal Reasoning test (CareerHarmony, 2003)  asks test takers to first 
observe a pair of words that are related to one another. A sample item looks like this: 
hospital : nurse 
Test takers will first need to determine the relationship of the pair (e.g., a nurse works in 
the hospital). Then they are presented with five additional pairs of words, and they must 
select the pair that best expresses the relationship conveyed by the original pair. Here, the 
order of the words in the pairs is important. For example, the option “waiter : restaurant” 
is not as good as the option “bank : teller”, since the former pair has an incorrect ordering 
of words, even though the relationship of the pair makes sense.  
Verbal reasoning focuses on prior knowledge of words, as well as the relationship 
between pairs of words. A test taker will need to put the words into working memory, and 
could potentially be more likely to disclose such information to future test takers. As far 
as test coaching is concerned, if the strategy to find the relationship such as “pay attention 
to the order of words” has been disclosed through information exchange and item sharing, 
test performance will likely be improved from baseline condition. In this case, both 
general test coaching and specific item information can contribute to benefiting from item 
sharing. 
 34 
Effects on Numerical and Verbal Reasoning 
Will the scores of numerical and verbal reasoning items increase the same way? 
Probably not. Previous research on test coaching, particularly SAT coaching studies (see 
Appendix A), suggests that SAT-M items are more likely to be influenced by test 
coaching than SAT-V items. One possible explanation is that coaching familiarizes test 
takers with rules for mathematical algorithms, while the meaning of words can only be 
learned through prior knowledge. If a test taker knows a reasonable number of rules for 
numerical reasoning items, it may be easier to determine the next number in a series. For 
instance, participants may learn that the relationship in the series depends on the pairs in 
the series, and hence improve their test scores. 
Another possible explanation for a larger coaching effect on numerical items is 
that each number represents only a single computational expression. For verbal items, a 
word can have several meanings, and picking the wrong interpretation may result in 
establishing an invalid word relation. Therefore, information about verbal items obtained 
through test coaching may be less helpful, if the test taker has a limited vocabulary, or 
lacks prior knowledge about the words. While it is possible to guess the meaning of a 
word through the primary lexical unit of a word such as its root, the lexical rules are more 
difficult to interpret than numerical computational rules. Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
the magnitude of numerical reasoning test score increases will be larger than verbal 
reasoning test score increases. 
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Study variables 
The dependent variable will provide an index of the degree to which a research 
participant learned from item sharing. It will be inferred from baseline and coached test 
scores for the Numerical Reasoning and Verbal Reasoning tests. As such, two parallel 
forms will be assembled and given before and after information exchange. Both forms 
will have items that are comparable in difficulty. The difference score between the two 
parallel forms will be the dependent variable of interest. 
As the study is interested in casual benefiting from item sharing, using a 
comprehensive “cheat sheet” to provide item preknowledge would not be feasible. As it 
is unlikely that previous test takers will have perfect memory, a casual benefiting from 
item sharing scenario is probably closer to real-life situations. 
As the study utilizes a within-subjects design, it could be argued that any score 
increases might be due to practice, as opposed to benefiting from item sharing. However, 
prior research (Powers, 1986) using meta-analysis found within-test practice effect sizes 
were generally smaller than test preparation studies. As participants will respond to two 
parallel forms within an hour, any score increase is more likely to be due to benefiting 
from item sharing, as opposed to simply practice in a short period of time. Importantly, 
the difference scores obtained from control group will be used to examine whether the 
experimental manipulation is effective. 
The independent variables include the Big Five personality variables, namely 
Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Emotional Stability, and Openness to 
Experience, an integrity scale measuring Honesty, Integrity, and Authenticity, and the 
experimental manipulation. Personality and Integrity tests will be administered in a way 
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that they do not look like they are related to the target behavior of interest (i.e., item 
sharing).  
Personality and integrity tests are often used in employee selection, and they are 
good predictors of job performance (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; Barrick & Mount, 1991). 
It is very likely that research participants may have responded to such questionnaires in 
the past and are familiar with the types of questions asked. As the study is designed to 
simulate a real job application situation, measures that are not valid predictors of job 
performance are excluded. 
. 
Research questions 
The first research question is a manipulation check on benefiting from item 
sharing, to see whether there is a difference between the experiment group and the control 
group. 
Research Question 1: Does item sharing influence test performance? 
 
The second research question involves asking which predictor variable best 
explains benefiting from item sharing. Items measuring the Five-Factor Model of 
personality are broad and intended to measure general personality constructs. Personality 
based integrity tests are designed to measure the tendency to behave in unethical ways 
(Berry, Sackett, & Wiemann, 2007). As such, it is important to see whether the broad, 
general measures of personality or the specific, personality based integrity test is more 
closely related to benefiting from item sharing. It is hypothesized that the integrity test 
will have greater predictive power than personality measures. 
 37 
Research Question 2: Are integrity test items more likely to explain benefiting 
from item sharing than personality measures? 
 
As the constructs of the Big Five model of personality may have different degrees 
of correlations with the willingness to engage in item sharing, it is important to see how 
they explain benefiting from item sharing. Based on the literature review, it is 
hypothesized that Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability will be better predictors 
than Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Openness to Experience. 
Research Question 3: Which personality construct(s) best explain benefiting from 
test coaching? 
 
In addition, it would also be of particular interest to examine whether those 
independent variables can identify participants in the experimental group from the control 
group.  
Research Question 4: Is benefiting from item sharing related to Integrity and 
personality measures? 
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METHODS 
Sample 
A total of 400 University of Illinois undergraduates from the Psychology 100 
subject pool were recruited for the study. Among them, 247 were in the experimental 
condition, with 45.2% male, 64% white, 11.7% Asian, 5.7% Hispanic, and 5.3% black. 
Their average undergraduate GPA was 3.24. The remaining 153 participants were in the 
control group, with 37.3% male, 47.7% white, 30.7% Asian, 10.5% Hispanic, and 2% 
black. Their average undergraduate GPA was 3.19. They received course credit in return 
for their participation. 
 
Measures 
Questionnaire 1 consisted of a 9-item self-report measure of integrity. The scale 
was obtained from the Honesty/Integrity/Authenticity scale of the International 
Personality Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg et al, 2006). It takes less than 3 minutes to 
complete Questionnaire 1. 
Two parallel forms of a cognitive ability test, Form A and Form B, were 
administered. Each form consists of two subtests, Numerical Reasoning and Verbal 
Reasoning. Each subtest has 15 items, and about 12 minutes in total were needed to 
complete the two subtests. The cognitive ability test has been administered to applicants 
around the world and has been found to have good criterion-related validity for a variety 
of jobs (CareerHarmony, 2003). 
One form of the personality inventory, obtained from the IPIP (Goldberg et al., 
2006), was also administered before the information exchange. The scale is composed of 
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50 items measuring the Big Five personality factors, and takes about 5 minutes to 
complete. 
The Psychology undergraduate subject pool is ideal for the purpose of the study 
because items on the cognitive ability test are similar to ACT/SAT questions and students 
should be familiar with these types of test materials and have prior experience with such 
items. 
 
Procedure 
For the experimental group, participants were randomly assigned to groups of 2 to 
6 after signing the informed consent. Within each group, about half of the participants 
were randomly assigned to receive Form A in Exercise 1, and the remaining participants 
received Form B in Exercise 1. 
All participants first responded to Questionnaire 1, which includes the integrity 
measure. They continued to Exercise 1, which included one form of the 15-item 
numerical reasoning test, one form of the 15-item verbal reasoning test, and a 50-item 
personality inventory. 
The order of presenting cognitive and personality items was counterbalanced, 
such that approximate 1/3 of participants took the numerical reasoning test first, another 
1/3 took the verbal reasoning test first, and the remaining 1/3 of participants took the 
personality inventory first. The order of these 3 measures was counterbalanced to reduce 
the order effect on memory recall. 
After 20 minutes, participants were asked to stop Exercise 1 and to start 
exchanging information about the test they just completed. They were asked to recall any 
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information that may help other students do well on the test. They were told that they 
could talk about anything they wanted, for instance, they could talk about questions and 
answers that appeared on Exercise 1, or strategies they used. They had about 5 minutes to 
exchange information. 
Then they spent approximately 20 minutes working on Exercise 2. Participants 
who took Form A in Exercise 1 worked on parallel Form B in Exercise 2, and vice versa. 
When they finished Exercise 2, they continued to Questionnaire 2. It included questions 
about their confidence in answering items correctly, the quality of the information 
exchange, their motivation for passing out information, demographic variables, and why 
or why not test information was exchanged. It took less than 3 minutes to complete the 
last part of the experiment. The total time commitment for the participants was less than 
50 minutes. 
The control group participants responded to the same materials as in the 
experimental group. As the control group was designed to measure the effectiveness of 
the experimental manipulation, they did not engage in information exchange and simply 
took the parallel forms. 
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RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics for cognitive ability measures 
Before examining the effects of item sharing, means and standard deviations of 
the baseline test scores were first compared within each study condition to examine the 
equivalence of parallel forms. Table 1 presents the reliabilities, means, standard 
deviations, and t-test comparisons of means before item sharing (i.e., Exercise 1). Both 
forms had comparable reliability, ranging between .62 and .87 for the experimental 
condition, and between .75 and .95 for the control condition. 
Before item sharing. 
For the experimental condition, both forms of the Numerical Reasoning scale had 
comparable means and standard deviations (M = 13.72, SD = 2.36; and M = 13.65, SD = 
2.20). The score difference between the two parallel forms was not significant (t = -.24, p 
= .81), and the effect size was small (d = -.03). Similarly, both forms of the Verbal 
Reasoning scale had comparable means and standard deviations (M = 12.16, SD = 2.37; 
and M = 12.15, SD = 2.32). The score difference between the two parallel forms was not 
significant (t = -.03, p = .97), with a very small effect size (d = -.01). The composite 
General Cognitive Ability measure (= Verbal Reasoning + Numerical Reasoning) also 
had comparable means and standard deviations (M = 25.88, SD = 4.02; and M = 25.80, 
SD = 3.52). Again, the score difference between the two parallel forms was not 
significant (t = -.17, p = .87), with a very small effect size (d = -.02). Therefore, in the 
experimental condition, both forms had similar means and standard deviations. 
Next, the control condition test scores were compared between the two parallel 
forms. Both forms of the Numerical Reasoning scale had comparable means and standard 
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deviations (M = 13.04, SD = 3.05; and M = 13.57, SD = 2.99). The score difference 
between the two parallel forms was not significant (t = 1.09, p = .28), and the effect size 
was small (d = .18). Similarly, both forms of the Verbal Reasoning scale had comparable 
means and standard deviations (M = 11.49, SD = 2.87; and M = 11.82, SD = 3.00). The 
score difference between the two parallel forms was also not significant (t = .70, p = .49), 
with a small effect size (d = .11). The composite General Cognitive Ability measure also 
had comparable means and standard deviations (M = 24.53, SD = 4.91; and M = 25.38, 
SD = 4.75), with non-significant score differences (t = 1.09, p = .28) and a small effect 
size (d = .18). Therefore, in the control condition, both forms had similar means and 
standard deviations. Insert Table 1 around here. 
After item sharing. 
Table 2 presents the reliabilities, means, standard deviations, and t-test 
comparisons of means after benefiting from item sharing (i.e., Exercise 2). After 
benefiting from item sharing, both forms had comparable reliability, ranging between .66 
and .85 for the experimental condition, and between .84 and .91 for the control condition. 
For the Numerical Reasoning test administered to the experimental group, both 
forms still had comparable means and standard deviations (M = 13.99, SD = 1.61; and M 
= 13.87, SD = 2.31). The score difference between the two parallel forms was not 
significant (t = -.47, p = .64), and the effect size was small (d = -.06). Similarly, after item 
sharing, both forms of the Verbal Reasoning scale had slightly increased means and 
slightly decreased standard deviations (M = 12.43, SD = 2.07; and M = 12.49, SD = 2.11). 
The score difference between the two parallel forms was not significant (t = .23, p = .82), 
and the effect size was also small (d = .03). The composite General Cognitive Ability 
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measure also had comparable means and standard deviations (M = 26.42, SD = 3.16; and 
M = 26.36, SD = 3.65). Again, the score difference between the two parallel forms was 
not significant (t = -.14, p = .89), with a very small effect size (d = -.02). Therefore, in the 
experimental condition, even with the manipulation of test coaching, both forms had 
similar means and standard deviations. 
Similar to the experimental condition, parallel forms of the Numerical Reasoning 
test in the control condition had comparable means and standard deviations (M = 12.79, 
SD = 3.98; and M = 13.54, SD = 3.05). The score difference between the two parallel 
Numerical Reasoning forms was not significant (t = 1.31, p = .19), and the effect size was 
small (d = .21). For the Verbal Reasoning scale, the means and standard deviations were 
comparable (M = 11.05, SD = 3.46; and M = 10.88, SD = 3.67), with a non-significant 
score difference (t = -.29, p = .77) and a small effect size (d = -.05). Insert Table 2 around 
here. 
Test score differences. 
As participants in both conditions had comparable means and standard deviations 
with small effect sizes, test score differences between the two parallel forms were 
computed. Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations, and t-test comparisons of 
means of difference scores. 
For the experimental condition, the mean score differences for the Numerical 
Reasoning scales were not significantly larger than 0 (M = .27, SD = 2.07, t = 1.48, p 
= .07; and M = .22, SD = 2.07, t = 1.17, p = .12), and the effect sizes were small (d = .19 
and .15). Similarly, for the Verbal Reasoning scales, the score differences were not 
significant larger than 0 for both conditions of the experimental group (M = .27, SD = 
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2.30, t = 1.29, p = .10; and M = .34, SD = 2.37, t = 1.60, p = .06), with small effect sizes 
(d = .16 and .20). However, the composite General Cognitive Ability measure was 
significantly greater than 0 (M = .54, SD = 3.50, t = 1.72, p = .05; and M = .56, SD = 3.11, 
t = 2.00, p = .03), with small effect sizes (d = .22 and .26) for one-tailed tests of the score 
increase. 
For the control group, there was no experimental manipulation. Interestingly, 
scores declined in Exercise 2. For the Numerical Reasoning scales, the score difference 
was not significantly different from 0 for both groups (M = -.25, SD = 4.46, t = -.49, p 
= .63; and M = -.03, SD = 2.91, t = -.08, p = .94), and the effect sizes were small (d = -.08 
and -.01). However, for the Verbal Reasoning scales, results were inconsistent: One 
condition saw no difference from zero and the other was significantly different from zero 
(M = -.44, SD = 3.56, t = -1.09, p = .28; and M = -.93, SD = 3.60, t = 2.26, p = .03), and 
the effect sizes ranged from small to moderate (d = -.18 and -.37). Results from the 
composite General Cognitive Ability measure were similar to the Verbal Reasoning 
scales (M = .69, SD = 5.56, t = -1.09, p = .28; and M = -.96, SD = 3.49, t = -2.40, p = .02), 
with small to moderate effect sizes (d = -.18 and -.39). These results suggest a possible 
fatigue effect. Insert Table 3 around Here. 
Test taker motivation. 
In this study, test taker motivation was evaluated using the common items of the 
post-test questionnaire given to the experimental and control groups. For the 
experimental condition, the mean and standard deviations were slightly smaller than the 
control group (M = 12.1, SD = 1.73, and M = 12.48, SD = 2.24, respectively), and the test 
taker motivation score difference was not significantly different from 0 (t = 1.83, p = .07), 
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with a small effect size (d = .19). This indicates that the test taker motivation was similar 
between the experimental and control groups. 
Pooled test scores. 
Given the extent of parallelism from the two forms, scores were pooled. Table 4 
presents the reliabilities, means, and standard deviations of the dependent and 
independent variables used in this study for the experimental and control conditions. The 
first three rows presents the pooled results after benefiting from item sharing (i.e., 
Exercise 2). Participants in the experimental condition had significantly higher pooled 
test scores than the control condition in the composite General Cognitive Ability (t = 4.99, 
p = .00), Numerical Reasoning (t = 2.78, p = .01), and Verbal Reasoning scales (t = 5.26, 
p = .00), with small to moderate effect sizes (d = .27 to .51).  
The next three rows present the pooled results of comparing the difference scores 
between the two exercises across the experimental and control conditions. Here, only the 
pooled composite General Cognitive Ability (t = 3.43, p = .00), and Verbal Reasoning 
scales (t = 3.31, p = .00) had significantly difference scores, with small to moderate effect 
sizes (d = .34 and .32). The score difference in Numerical Reasoning (t = 1.33, p = .18) 
was not significant, with a small effect size (d = .13). These results suggest that test 
coaching effected scales differently, with the effect on Verbal Reasoning items more than 
twice as large as the effect on Numerical Reasoning items. When the composite General 
Cognitive Ability scale is considered, the effect of benefiting from item sharing is similar 
to the effect on the Verbal Reasoning scale. Insert Table 4 around here. 
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Research Question 1: Does item sharing influence test performance? 
To answer the first research question, test scores from the experimental condition 
and control condition were compared using pooled test scores. For the Numerical 
Reasoning scale, the effect was significant but small (t = 2.78, p = .01, d = .27). For the 
Verbal Reasoning scale, the effect was larger (t = 5.26, p = .00, d = .51). A similar result 
was found on the composite General Cognitive Ability scale (t = 4.99, p = .00, d = .48). 
As such, research question 1 was answered affirmatively. 
 
Descriptive statistics for integrity and personality measures 
The 9-item Integrity scale had a mean of 37.46 (about 7.20 positively endorsed 
items) and standard deviation of 4.37 for the experimental group, and a mean of 35.99 
(about 6.76 positively endorsed items) and standard deviation of 5.13 for the control 
group. The score difference was significant (t = 3.06, p < .01), with a moderate effect size 
(d = .31). Among the Big Five constructs, Agreeableness was most frequently endorsed 
(M = 39.72, SD = 5.44 for the experimental group and M = 38.52, SD = 5.79 for the 
control group), followed by Openness to Experience (M = 36.92, SD = 4.98 for the 
experimental group and M = 36.39, SD = 5.88 for the control group). All five personality 
scales had small effect sizes for the difference between the control and experimental 
groups, ranging from -.04 to .23. 
 
Scale correlations 
Table 5 shows the correlations for dependent and independent variables for the 
experimental and control groups. Undergraduate GPA was not correlated with the 
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General Cognitive ability score difference (GD). Integrity was significantly correlated 
with General Cognitive ability score difference (r = .13, p = .04). This means the effect of 
benefiting from item sharing may be partially explained by Integrity. 
For the control group, among the Big Five personality scales, only 
Conscientiousness and Agreeableness were significantly correlated with the General 
Cognitive ability difference score (r = .16, p = .01; and r = .16, p = .01). For the control 
group, none of the independent variables were significantly correlated with the dependent 
variable. Insert Table 5 around here. 
 
Multiple regression with the experimental group 
The first set of regression analyses was performed using the experimental sample 
only. As participants in the experimental condition were subject to various degrees of test 
coaching, results presented here could be similar to those in settings with low to moderate 
stakes, e.g., unproctored Internet testing, where some levels of cheating could occur 
easily yet be difficult to detect. Table 6 displays the unstandardized regression 
coefficients (B) and intercept, the standardized regression coefficients (β), R2, and 
adjusted R2. Insert Table 6 around here. 
 
First regression model: General Cognitive score difference. 
The first model used the General Cognitive score difference (GD) as the 
dependent variable. As specific personality constructs have different degrees of 
correlations with the dependent variable, it is of particular interest to examine all 5 
personality subscales, namely Extraversion (EXT), Conscientiousness (CON), 
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Agreeableness (AGR), Emotional Stability (EMO), and Openness to Experience (OPE). 
Thus, the first regression equation included Undergraduate GPA, Integrity, EXT, CON, 
AGR, EMO, and OPE as independent variables.  
The first regression model showed significant predictability, with the R 
significantly different greater than zero (R = .31, F = 3.36, p = .01), with R2 = .10. The 
adjusted R2 value of .07 indicates that approximate 7% of the variability was predicted by 
Undergraduate GPA, Integrity, Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, 
Emotional Stability, and Openness to Experience combined. 
Among the independent variables, Emotional Stability showed the largest and 
most significant contribution to the model, with t = - 2.55 and p = .01. Conscientiousness 
was also significant, with t = 2.36 and p = .02. Both had large standardized coefficients. 
The remaining independent variables were not significant.  
As General Cognitive score difference (GD) consists of the Numerical Reasoning 
score difference (ND) and the Verbal Reasoning score difference (VD), two additional 
regression equations were formulated to use ND and VD as the dependent variable, 
respectively, to explore which independent variable best explains benefiting from item 
sharing. 
 
Second regression model: Numerical Reasoning score difference. 
Model 2 used the Numerical Reasoning score difference (ND) as the dependent 
variable, and Undergraduate GPA, Integrity, EXT, CON, AGR, EMO, and OPE as 
independent variables. This regression model showed no significant predictability and 
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had a low multiple correlation (R = .22, F = 1.67, p = .12), although Emotional Stability 
again had the largest standardized coefficient that was significant (t = -2.52, p = .01).  
 
Third regression model: Verbal Reasoning score difference. 
Model 3 used the Verbal Reasoning score difference (VD) as the dependent 
variable and the same set of independent variables in Model 1 and 2. Here, the third 
regression model had an overall R = .32, which was significant (F = 3.46, p < .01). 
Conscientiousness had the largest standardized coefficient (t = 3.42, p < .01).  
 
Research Question 2: Are integrity test items more likely to explain benefiting 
from item sharing than personality measures? 
Across all three regression models in the experimental group, the Integrity scale 
was not a significant predictor of benefiting from item sharing. 
 
Research Question 3: Which personality construct best explains benefiting from 
item sharing? 
Using the General Cognitive score difference (GD) as the dependent variable, 
both Emotional Stability and Conscientiousness contributed significantly to the model. 
As such, Emotional Stability and Conscientiousness better explain benefiting from item 
sharing than other personality constructs that were not significant. Further analysis 
showed that Conscientiousness was the best predictor of the Verbal Reasoning score 
difference (VD), while Emotional Stability was the best for explaining the Numerical 
Reasoning score difference (ND). 
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Multiple regression with the control group 
Another set of regression analyses was performed using the control group only, 
using Undergraduate GPA, Integrity, EXT, CON, AGR, EMO, and OPE as independent 
variables. While both the experimental group and control group had similar descriptive 
statistics, the independent variables were unable to explain the score differences observed 
in the control group. 
Regardless of which dependent variable was used, none of the independent 
variables was able to contribute to the regression model significantly. The unstandardized 
regression coefficients (B) and intercept, the standardized regression coefficients (β), R2, 
and adjusted R2 for the control group are shown in Table 7. Insert Table 7 around here. 
 
Multiple regression with the experimental and control groups combined 
The third set of regression analyses was performed using both the experimental 
and control group samples. Results presented here could be used to see whether the 
independent variables are able to differentiate participants with or without item sharing. 
That is, these analyses consider whether the effects of item sharing can be predicted using 
Integrity and personality measures. 
Table 8 shows the correlations for dependent and independent variables for the 
experimental and control groups combined. The General Cognitive ability score 
difference (GD) and the Verbal Reasoning score difference (VD) were significantly 
correlated with Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to 
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Experience. The Numerical Reasoning score difference (ND) was not significantly 
correlated with any of the independent variables. Insert Table 8 around here. 
 
First regression model: General Cognitive score difference. 
The first regression model utilized General Cognitive score difference (GD) as the 
dependent variable and Undergraduate GPA, Integrity, Extraversion, Conscientiousness, 
Agreeableness, Emotional Stability, Openness to Experience, and Group Membership as 
independent variables. The regression was significant (R = .23, F = 2.77, p = .01), with 
R2 = .05 and an adjusted R2 value of .03. The only significant regression coefficient was 
Group Membership (t = - 3.14 and p < .01), which also had the largest standardized 
coefficient β, followed by Emotional Stability, and Conscientiousness. Table 9 displays 
the unstandardized regression coefficients (B) and intercept, the standardized regression 
coefficients (β), R2, and adjusted R2. Insert Table 9 around here. 
 
Second regression model: Numerical Reasoning score difference. 
The second regression model utilized the Numerical Reasoning score difference 
(ND) as the dependent variable. Results showed that the independent variables had a low 
multiple correlation (R = .16) with the dependent variable, and the regression was not 
significant (F = 1.29, p = .25). Here, Emotional Stability had the largest standardized 
coefficient β, followed by Openness to Experience, Undergraduate GPA, and Group 
Membership. However, none of the regression coefficients was significant. 
 
 52 
Third regression model: Verbal Reasoning score difference. 
Finally, the third regression model utilized the Verbal Reasoning score difference 
(VD) as the dependent variable. The regression was significant (R = .26, F = 3.53, p < 
.01), with R2 = .07 with an adjusted R2 value of .05. The regression coefficient for Group 
Membership was significant (t = - 3.06 and p < .01) with the largest standardized 
coefficient β, followed by Conscientiousness (t = 2.43 and p = .02). 
 
Research Question 4: Can benefiting from item sharing be identified from 
Integrity and personality measures? 
When the experimental and control group data were combined, regression models 
using the General Cognitive score difference (GD) or the Verbal Reasoning score 
difference (VD) were significant, with Group Membership having the largest 
standardized regression coefficient in both cases. Conscientiousness was significant in the 
regression equation for the Verbal Reasoning score difference (VD). No Integrity or 
personality measure was related to the General Cognitive score difference (GD) or the 
Numerical Reasoning score difference (ND). Research question 4 was partially answered 
affirmatively. In other words, only the personality construct of Conscientiousness was 
able to identify test takers who benefited from item sharing, and only on the Verbal 
Reasoning score difference (VD) when the regression model included a dummy variable 
for the experimental manipulation. 
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DISCUSSION 
Manipulation of item sharing 
In this study, item sharing was operationalized as a casual information exchange 
about questions and answers on a test in the hope of getting a better test score. As 
previous studies on item preknowledge utilized either organized item theft or simulations 
based on various assumptions, it is of particular interest to see if this casual item sharing 
scenario has an effect on test performance. Results showed that there were significant 
score differences between the experimental and the control conditions, with moderate 
effect sizes around .42 (averaged across parallel forms). Such between group score 
differences showed that casual item sharing through the use of item preknowledge can 
have an effect on test performance, even though participants were not asked specifically 
to memorize and share the test information. 
In a repeated measure design, there is always a concern about within-subjects 
score differences. For the control group participants, test scores decreased slightly (on 
average, -.55). This could due to external factors such as fatigue and decreased 
motivation. As such a score decrease was not significant and the effect sizes were small 
(on average, d = -.20), there is support for the notion that within-test practice effects 
played a very minor role in score change (Powers, 1986) in this study. For the 
experimental group participants, while their test scores increased slightly (on average, 
.37), the score change was not significant, and the effect size was small as well (on 
average, d = .20). While it can be argued that such score fluctuation within subjects may 
represent practice effects, it should be noted that item sharing contributed to the score 
difference. Indeed, when test scores of the experimental group and the control group are 
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compared, a significant score difference and small to moderate effect sizes showed that 
item sharing did indeed play a role. 
 
Casual versus organized item sharing 
Organized item sharing refers to systematic item theft in which a large portion of 
the item pool is exposed such that future test takers can benefit from the item 
preknowledge disclosed by previous test takers. In a previous study on an organized item 
theft (Do, Brummel, Chuah, & Drasgow, 2006), when participants were given a cheat 
sheet with either correct or incorrect responses, their scores were significantly different 
from the control group, with moderate to large effect sizes. It was also found that 
regardless of item difficulty, participants relied more on the item preknowledge provided, 
as opposed to utilizing their own ability to answer questions. However, in occupational 
settings, unless the stakes for the selection are high, it appears unlikely that test takers 
will engage in much effort toward organized item theft. Therefore, it seems more likely 
that casual item sharing may occur in employee selection. 
The current study utilized a casual item sharing scenario and found small to 
moderate effect sizes on score differences. Participants were not given a cheat sheet, and 
the amount of information shared was totally up to the participants. During the study, 
participants in the experimental condition were asked what items were disclosed to them 
during the information exchange. Results showed that on average, 2.57 numerical 
reasoning items and 2 verbal reasoning items were shared. This translates to 
approximately 15% of the items being compromised. What is the practical implication of 
this item exposure rate? Simulations performed by Stocking, Ward, and Potenza (1998) 
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found that with 10% of the items compromised, the increases in test scores were rather 
small, but when 20% of the item pool was disclosed, the effects were large enough to 
have practical consequences. In academic and licensing exams, as the stakes are much 
higher than employment tests, it is more likely to observe large scale, organized item 
theft. In employee selection, unless applicants are motivated to perform well, organized 
item theft seems unlikely. However, even in this casual item sharing scenario, test scores 
were increased significantly and approximate 15% of the items were disclosed. Thus, 
benchmarking against Stocking et al.’s results, a casual conspiracy of the sort studied 
here may lead to serious consequences. With the growing popularity of unproctored 
Internet testing, it is even more important to pay attention to item sharing activities. 
Methods to reduce item exposure to less than 10%, include increasing the size of the item 
pool, and shortening the length of test windows. 
 
Numerical versus verbal reasoning 
While the cognitive processes underlying numerical reasoning and verbal 
reasoning are beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that item sharing had 
somewhat different effects on the two constructs. With regards to the number of items 
exposed, there were slightly more disclosed items for the Numerical Reasoning scale than 
the Verbal Reasoning scale (2.57 versus 2). Upon first look, it appears that the score 
difference would be greater for Numerical reasoning scale, as about 29% more items 
were disclosed. However, that was not the case. 
When comparing experimental and control groups, on average, the score 
difference was .77 for the Numerical Reasoning scale and 1.50 for the Verbal Reasoning 
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scale. In other words, the Verbal Reasoning scale score increase (d = .51) was about 
twice as large as the Numerical Reasoning scale (d = .26). As mentioned previously, there 
is no need to memorize numbers in order to solve numerical reasoning questions; 
moreover it may be more difficult to recall an exact number series. Because numerical 
reasoning questions rely on strategies for determining computational rules, item 
preknowledge such as “think of the number series in pairs as opposed to triplets or quads” 
may benefit future test takers more than the simple help given to answer verbal items. 
Providing exact answers for numerical reasoning questions could be of little help to 
future test takers, as it would be difficult for them to match the answer such as 24 to the 
question (unless there is only one option of 24 in the whole test). Strategies provided by 
previous test takers might be more beneficial to future test takers, and this is probably 
why there were more Numerical Reasoning items disclosed during information exchange 
than Verbal Reasoning items. 
Verbal Reasoning, on the other hand, focuses on prior knowledge of words, as 
well as the relationship between pairs of words. Because a test taker needs to put the 
words into working memory, it could be easier for them to disclose accurate item 
information to future test takers. For example, information such as “the right answer 
about an airplane is cruise ship” provides specific information that could be more 
beneficial than strategies such as “think about not only the relationship between the pairs 
of words, but also the order of the word pairs”. Therefore, both general test coaching as 
well as specific item preknowledge can lead to benefiting from item sharing. 
However, when within-subject score differences are considered, the uneven score 
increase between the Numerical Reasoning and Verbal Reasoning disappeared. On 
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average, the Verbal Reasoning scale had a slightly larger score increase (d = .18) than the 
Numerical Reasoning scale (d = .17). While this appears to be opposite to what was 
hypothesized earlier in the paper, the mean differences between the Numerical Reasoning 
and Verbal Reasoning score differences were quite small. It appeared that if one is good 
at the test before item sharing, s/he will continue to be good at the test after item sharing. 
Item sharing helps performance a little bit, but not enough to create a huge score jump. 
This notion is consistent with the findings for the SAT that coaching yields about 15 to 
25 point each on the Verbal and the Mathematical portions of the SAT. Such score 
increases add little improvement to a “typical” test taker’s standing (Powers, 1993). 
 
Benefiting from item sharing 
Compared to academic and licensing exams, employment testing can utilize 
various selection measures to make a hiring decision (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). This 
strength allow us to use other valid predictors of job performance to explain benefiting 
from item sharing behavior without asking overt questions about ethics or motivation that 
are less likely to be answered honestly in an occupational testing setting. In addition to 
undergraduate GPA, this study utilized integrity and five personality factors to explain 
benefiting from item sharing. While prior research has shown that personality based 
integrity tests can measure the tendency to behave in unethical ways (Berry, Sackett, & 
Wiemann, 2007), integrity scale scores did not correlate highly with the general cognitive 
score difference. As such, integrity items were able to explain very little about the 
dependent variable. It seems that benefiting from item sharing is not an effect that can be 
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explained through integrity tests, at least in the context of experiments along the lines at 
the one described here. 
The reason why personality can explain benefiting from item sharing is probably 
due to the broad range of behaviors that can be predicted from the general constructs of 
Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability. Conscientiousness is usually considered to be 
the best predictor of contextual performance (Borman, Klimoski, & Ilgen, 2001), and it is 
correlated with goal-setting, expectancy, and self-efficacy motivation (Judge & Ilies, 
2002). Neuroticism, however, was not highly related to job performance (Salgado, 1997; 
Judge & Bono, 2001). Nonetheless, prior research has found Neuroticism to be 
moderately correlated with three central aspects of motivation (Judge & Ilies, 2002). It 
seems that the results found in this study resemble what Judge and Ilies (2002) found for 
personality and performance motivation. In their meta-analysis, they found that 
Neuroticism and Conscientiousness were the strongest correlates of performance 
motivation. In employee selection, overt questions about motivation can be easily faked 
because there are obvious right or wrong answers to motivational questions. However, 
personality inventories maybe more covert and the general public usually believes that 
there are no right or wrong answers to personality items. Thus, it makes sense to utilize 
personality to predict the effect of benefiting from item sharing. 
As benefiting from item sharing is best explained by Conscientiousness and 
Neuroticism, it is important to consider practical implications of these two constructs. 
Why would people engage in item sharing to improve their test performance? It could be 
argued that they are trying to present themselves as “ideal employees” such that their 
chance of being selected would be better (Schmit & Ryan, 1993). Because 
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conscientiousness people are usually hard working and goal oriented, they may be 
motivated to utilize item preknowledge to their advantage. Among the Big Five, 
Conscientiousness is also the most highly related to intentions and behavior (Conner & 
Abraham, 2001). While this study only explores casual item sharing scenarios, when 
several test takers realize the “true benefit” of item sharing in an employee selection 
context, they may become more organized and engage in item theft. In other words, “too 
conscientiousness” may result in individuals actively seeking test information as well as 
using it to present themselves as ideal employees who know all the ropes of the job even 
before being hired. While conscientiousness people are usually very motivated and 
perform well on the job, if they do not consider item sharing to be unethical and wrong, 
they may engage in item sharing to their advantage. 
It is also interesting to see that Conscientiousness was able to explain benefiting 
from item sharing better for the Verbal Reasoning than the Numerical Reasoning scale. 
Conscientiousness people may be very motivated to perform well on the test to get the 
job and thus the specific item preknowledge of the Verbal Reasoning yielded a greater 
benefit than knowledge of the Numerical Reasoning items. As mentioned previously, in 
Verbal Reasoning, prior knowledge of the words could be much more useful than 
preknowledge of strategies to solve Numerical Reasoning items. Therefore, if Verbal 
Reasoning items are necessary parts of a screening tool, it might be necessary to generate 
word pairs in a way that more than two questions have shared words as part of the 
options, and thus reduce the utility of specific item information. 
In general, neuroticism is negatively correlated with job performance and 
performance motivation. As explained by the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991), 
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test takers who are emotionally stable may regard using item preknowledge as a way to 
facilitate their performance and perceive benefiting from item sharing as a means for 
greater control over their test performance. They are interested in performing well to 
reduce negative attitudes, affect, and behavior (Judge, Van Vianen, & De Pater, 2004). In 
other words, the reason they benefit from item sharing is to help them gain control in the 
selection process.  
In the experimental group, as Emotional Stability was able to explain the General 
Cognitive ability score difference as well as Numerical Reasoning, it seems people who 
are emotionally stable were less able to benefit more from item information that is related 
to strategies to solve questions, as opposed to specific knowledge of words as in Verbal 
Reasoning. From an organizational perspective, emotionally stable people may be more 
likely to seek to understand rules and strategies to help them perform well, as opposed to 
relying on a quick fix and short term solutions. As they are usually motivated, their 
emotional stability in general is beneficial to performance. 
Finally, the current study found that benefiting from item sharing can be detected 
from Integrity and personality measures only when General Cognitive score difference 
(GD) or Verbal Reasoning score difference (VD) was used as the dependent variable, but 
not on Numerical Reasoning score difference (ND). Among the independent variables, 
Conscientiousness was the only one that contributed significantly to VD. As such, using 
Conscientiousness as a predictor of benefiting from item sharing in Verbal Reasoning 
tests might be warranted. 
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Practical implications of Conscientiousness 
As benefiting from item sharing is best explained by Conscientiousness, yet 
Conscientiousness is also a good predictor of job performance, the practical implications 
of using Conscientiousness as part of a selection hurdle seem to send out mixed signals. 
On the one hand, employers like to hire or promote employees who are conscientious 
because they are more proficient on the job (Barrick & Mount, 1991), more likely to have 
career success (Judge, Higgins, Thoresen, & Barrick, 1999), more likely to performance 
to contribute to the social and psychological core of the organization (Borman, Klimoski, 
& Ilgen, 2001), and more likely to possess performance motivation such as goal-setting, 
expectancy, and self-efficacy motivation (Judge & Ilies, 2002). On the other hand, if the 
test taker is highly motivated and engages in response distortion (Salgado, Remeseiro, & 
Iglesias, 1996) or item sharing, it renders the validity of the test questionable. 
It should be noted that prior research has showed response distortion has little 
effect on the validity of the test. If the instrument is construct oriented, intentional 
distortion of self-descriptions in a desirable way does not affect criterion-related validities 
(Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990) or the construct validity of 
personality measures used in real-world selection contexts (Smith & Ellingson, 2002), at 
least in some studies. However, when faking was high, social desirability would interact 
with the personality predictor and could reduce validity close to zero (White, Young, & 
Rumsey, 2001). Nevertheless, a meta-analysis showed impression management has been 
found to have little effect on the prediction of job performance for managerial jobs where 
interpersonal interactions are important (Viswesvaran, Ones, & Hough, 2001). 
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However, while the validity of the test may be unaffected by response distortion, 
strategies used by applicants can affect the rank ordering of job applicants and selection 
decisions (Levin & Zickar, 2002). For instance, overt tests have been found to be more 
susceptible to fake good coaching conditions (Alliger, Lilienfeld, & Mitchell, 1996). 
Alliger and Dwight (2000) argued that in overt tests, faking can inflate test scores by 
approximately one standard deviation above honest instruction (d =1.02), and coaching 
can inflate overt scores by a half standard deviation above fake good conditions (d =1.54). 
Nevertheless, on personality based covert integrity tests, faking has been found to inflate 
the scores by about one half standard deviation (d =.59). Comparing coaching on covert 
personality based integrity tests versus honest conditions, the effect size was smaller (d 
=.36) than fake good versus honest conditions. This indicates that with covert tests, 
response distortion due to faking or coaching is much less. 
What are the practical implications if conscientiousness people are very motivated 
and benefit much from item sharing? First, as conscientiousness contribute to job 
performance and yet the effect of response distortion from faking or coaching conditions 
are moderate to small, it can be argued that the benefits of “too conscientiousness” 
outweighs the risks of response distortion. Second, even with the concern of response 
distortion, in general conscientiousness is not the single most important hurdle in 
personnel selection. As such, scores from other tests can be considered at the same time, 
and it is possible to utilize select-out rather than select-in strategies to remove obviously 
unqualified test takers (Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2003). Finally, it is also 
possible to ask test takers to sign a non-disclosure agreement as well as endorsing an 
honor code to reduce the likelihood of item sharing. While the usefulness of warning and 
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the threat of retesting in a proctored environment are questionable, if a test taker agrees 
with the pre-testing consent and later violates the agreement, the company could pursuit 
legal action if desired.  
 
Is this study actually about how well participants follow instructions? 
While it can be argued that the score change observed on the dependent variables 
may simply due to how well participants followed the experimental instructions, I can 
propose at least three ways to argue this was not the case. First, it is possible to examine 
this factor by looking at test taker motivation. It should be noted that there was no 
significant score difference on test taker motivation between the experimental and control 
groups, and the effect size was small. Thus, participants in the experimental condition 
were not particularly motivated to engage in item sharing. 
Another possible way to study how well participants follow study instruction is to 
give out a questionnaire at the end of the study to ask them to self-report the quality of 
participation. However, whether test takers will respond to such questions honestly is 
questionable. It is possible that some participants may respond favorably for the fear that 
the experimenter might punish them if they responded to the question unfavorably, 
because a research study only ends when the debriefing is given, and it is not uncommon 
for psychological studies to utilize deception. Thus, asking participants on how well they 
follow research instructions is not an ideal solution. 
Furthermore, while it can be argued that participants in the experimental condition 
followed the research instruction well, it can also be argued that they did not follow the 
instructions well. In the study, participants were given about five minutes to exchange 
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information. If they follow the instructions well, they would utilize the full five minutes 
to share item information. However, none of the participants fully utilized the five 
minutes. In other words, unless participants are very motivated and followed the 
instructions well, it can be argued that how well they followed instructions is 
questionable. It should be noted that the study was designed to examine casual item 
sharing. If participants were very motivated and recalled several items, the present study 
would be measuring organized or semi-organized item sharing, not casual item sharing. 
 
Can other variables explain benefiting from item sharing? 
Even though this study found Conscientiousness to be the best predictor of 
benefiting from item sharing in Verbal Reasoning, it should be noted that specific facets 
of conscientiousness could explain more. The facets of conscientiousness include 
orderliness, self-control, industriousness, responsibility, traditionality, decisiveness, 
punctuality, formality, and virtue (Roberts, Chernyshenko, Stark, & Goldberg, 2005). 
However, using multiple items to measure all facets of conscientiousness may be too time 
consuming in a multiple hurdle selection approach, and doing so may not necessarily 
detect test takers who benefit from item sharing. Further research could be performed to 
identify key facets of conscientiousness related to item sharing 
Similarly, while it is possible to utilize other variables such as justice and ethics as 
part of the selection package, additional study needs to be done to see how other variables 
may be utilized to explain item sharing. For instance, prior research has found academic 
dishonesty is negatively related to self-concept, cognitive development, and attitude 
toward cheating (Arvidson, 2004). However, whether it is appropriate to use those 
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instruments measuring the above mentioned constructs in a selection context is also 
questionable and requires further study. 
 
Limitations and directions for future research 
While this study examined two cognitive constructs, certainly there are other 
domains that may be subject to item sharing. For example, in the Do et al. (2006) study, a 
critical reasoning test with long question stems and response options was used. It would 
be interesting to see whether item sharing would have different effects on different types 
of cognitive constructs and assessment formats. 
Furthermore, there can be multiple screening and selection tools utilized before a 
hiring decision is made. As such, different assessment tools could be used to predict 
benefiting from item sharing on different types of cognitive constructs. As the current 
independent variables explained small to moderate amounts of variance of benefiting 
from item sharing, further research could examine other predictors. 
Items used in the current study had a short item length and could be answered 
quickly. However, it is possible that a longer item length may result in better item recall 
due to much more information about the context of the question being available to 
provide additional help for item memorization and recall. Future research could explore 
the relationships of item length and item recall. 
It is possible that there are alternative ways to share information. For instance, by 
using a confederate in the group to induce item sharing. However, doing so may also 
introduce experimenter bias by focusing exclusively on the item sharing. In this study, 
participants in the experimental condition were asked to exchange information about the 
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test they just completed. They were also told that they could talk about anything they 
wanted. Further research could be conducted to explore alternative ways of verbal item 
sharing. 
The study manipulated item sharing by matching future test takers with past test 
takers. However, it is possible that there could be other forms of information exchange. 
For example, it is not necessary for information exchange to be conducted verbally. As 
many test booklets are reused, it is possible that previous test takers may intentionally or 
unintentionally leave evidence of their responses. For instance, some test takers may 
prefer to mark their responses on the test booklet and transcribe them onto a bubble sheet 
later, or write the steps involved in a calculation. Such test coaching may be worth 
studying if test booklets are reused. 
In addition, it is possible that the effect of benefiting from item sharing may be 
influenced by how information is exchanged. Future test takers may consider verbal 
information exchange as a way to “trick me” and be afraid to “get caught” and thus rely 
less on item preknowledge. Information obtained through erased responses on test 
booklets or postings on the Internet may provide a sense of anonymity and thus be 
considered a “safer” way to cheat than talking to previous test takers. It is unknown 
whether there will be differences with regards to different information exchange media. 
In a computerized testing scenario, it becomes much easier for test developers to 
change the order of response options, as well as replacing words with synonyms or 
related words. Such watermark-like changes could be useful in tracking item exposure as 
well as detecting aberrant responses. Further research on this topic may be helpful to 
understand how items are memorized and recalled. 
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Conclusion 
In continuously administered employment tests, test security may be 
compromised by examinees revealing test items to future test candidates. A specific type 
of test coaching involving disclosing items, called item sharing, can result in significant 
score increases, with small to moderate effect sizes. Conscientiousness and Emotional 
Stability were found to be the best predictors of benefiting from test coaching. 
Conscientiousness was able to predict the Verbal Reasoning score difference well, while 
Emotional Stability was better in explaining the General Cognitive ability score 
difference, as well as the Numerical Reasoning score difference. When test takers with or 
without item preknowledge were combined, the only variable other than group 
membership that can identify benefiting from item sharing was Conscientiousness. 
Limitations of the current study and directions for further research such as the facets of 
Conscientiousness were discussed and suggested in the hope of helping us better 
understand the effects of item sharing.
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Cognitive scale descriptive statistics, before item sharing (Exercise 1) 
 
Before item sharing   Form A    Form B      
Experimental Condition N α M SD N α M SD M dif t p d 
General Cognitive 124 .76 25.88 4.02 123 .81 25.80 3.52  -.08 -.17 .87 -.02 
Numerical reasoning 124 .71 13.72 2.36 123 .87 13.65 2.20 -.07 -.24 .81 -.03 
Verbal reasoning 124 .62 12.16 2.37 123 .63 12.15 2.32 -.02 -.03 .97 -.01 
Control Condition             
General Cognitive 77 .90 24.53 4.91 76 .91 25.38 4.75  .85 1.09 .28  .18 
Numerical reasoning 77 .95 13.04 3.05 76 .92 13.57 2.99  .53 1.09 .28  .18 
Verbal reasoning 77 .75 11.49 2.87 76 .80 11.82 3.00  .33  .70 .49  .11 
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Table 2. Cognitive scale descriptive statistics, after item sharing (Exercise 2) 
 
After item sharing   Form B    Form A      
Experimental Condition N α M SD N α M SD M dif t p d 
General Cognitive 124 .76 26.42 3.16 123 .83 26.36 3.65 -.06 -.14 .89 -.02 
Numerical reasoning 124 .81 13.99 1.61 123 .85 13.87 2.31 -.12 -.47 .64 -.06 
Verbal reasoning 124 .66 12.43 2.07 123 .68 12.49 2.11 .06  .23 .82  .03 
Control Condition             
General Cognitive 77 .89 23.84 6.15 76 .89 24.42 5.10 .58  .64 .53  .10 
Numerical reasoning 77 .91 12.79 3.98 76 .88 13.54 3.05 .75 1.31 .19  .21 
Verbal reasoning 77 .85 11.05 3.46 76 .84 10.88 3.67 -.17 -.29 .77 -.05 
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Table 3. Cognitive scale descriptive statistics of the difference scores 
 
Experimental Condition  N M SD t p d 
General Cognitive Form B-A 124 .54 3.50 1.72 .09 .22 
 Form A-B 123 .56 3.11 2.00 .05* .26 
Numerical reasoning Form B-A 124 .27 2.07 1.48 .14 .19 
 Form A-B 123 .22 2.07 1.17 .24 .15 
Verbal reasoning Form B-A 124 .27 2.30 1.29 .20 .16 
 Form A-B 123 .34 2.37 1.60 .11 .20 
Control Condition        
General Cognitive Form B-A 77 -.69 5.56 -1.09 .28 -.18 
 Form A-B 76 -.96 3.49 -2.40 .02* -.39 
Numerical reasoning Form B-A 77 -.25 4.46 -.49 .63 -.08 
 Form A-B 76 -.03 2.91 -.08 .94 -.01 
Verbal reasoning Form B-A 77 -.44 3.56 -1.09 .28 -.18 
 Form A-B 76 -.93 3.60 -2.26 .03* -.37 
 
 71 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics comparing the experimental and control conditions. 
   Control    Experimental      
Variables N α M SD N α M SD M dif t p d 
General Cognitive pooled 153  24.13 5.65 247  26.39 3.41 2.26 4.99 .00 .48
Numerical Reasoning pooled 153  13.16 3.55 247  13.93 1.99 .77 2.78 .01 .27
Verbal Reasoning pooled 153  10.97 3.57 247  12.46 2.09 1.49 5.26 .00 .51
General Cognitive difference 153  -.82 4.65 247  .55 3.31 1.37 3.43 .00 .34
Numerical Reasoning difference 153  -.14 3.77 247  .25 2.07 .39 1.33 .18 .13
Verbal Reasoning difference 153  -.68 3.58 247  .30 2.34 .99 3.31 .00 .32
Undergraduate GPA 153  3.19 .48 247  3.24 .51 .05 .97 .33 .10
Integrity 153 .74 35.99 5.13 247 .73 37.46 4.37 1.47 3.06 .00 .31
Composite Personality 153 .83 175.04 19.99 247 .83 178.25 19.18 3.21 1.60 .11 .16
Extraversion 153 .75 33.63 7.36 247 .75 34.27 4.37 .64 1.09 .28 .11
Agreeableness 153 .67 38.52 5.79 247 .69 39.72 5.44 1.20 2.09 .04 .21
Conscientiousness 153 .66 32.87 6.28 247 .75 34.33 6.46 1.46 2.22 .03 .23
Emotional Stability 153 .76 33.32 7.52 247 .73 33.02 6.61 -.30 -.42 .68 -.04
Openness to Experience 153 .66 36.39 5.88 247 .68 36.92 4.98 .53 .96 .34 .10
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Table 5. Correlations. 
 
 1. GD 2. ND 3. VD 4. GPA 5. INT 6. EXT 7. AGR 8. CON 9. EMO 10. OPE 
1. General Cognitive 
difference (GD) - .66** .61** -.04 -.04 .06 .04 .02 .04 .14 
2. Numerical Reasoning 
difference (ND) .71** - -.20* -.11 -.03 -.07 -.02 -.06 -.05 .04 
3. Verbal Reasoning 
difference (VD) .78** .12 - -.06 -.02 .15 .07 .09 .10 .13 
4. Undergraduate GPA 
(GPA) .01 -.06 .07 - .11 .07 -.07 .11 .06 .05 
5. Integrity (INT) 
 .15* .12 .11 .07 - .21* .26** .27** .18* .25* 
6. Extraversion (EXT) 
 .14* .06 .14* .04 .35** - .54** .41** .31** .60** 
7. Agreeableness (AGR) 
 .18** .08 .19** .09 .35** .47** - .51** .32** .48** 
8. Conscientiousness 
(CON) .19** .01 .26** .20** .40** .25** .47** - .20* .40** 
9. Emotional Stability 
(EMO) 
 
-.04 -.10 .03 .07 .26** .33** .38** .31** - .28** 
10. Openness to 
Experience (OPE) .09 .06 .08 .09 .25** .46** .48** .33** .30** - 
Note. Sample correlations for the experimental condition (N = 247) are below the diagonal and correlations for the control condition 
(N =153) are above the diagonal. * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 6. Regression models for the experimental condition 
 
Model 1: DV: General Cognitive difference (GD) 
Variables B SE B β t p 
Constant -4.69 2.45  -1.91 .06 
Undergraduate GPA -.24 .45 -.04 -.53 .60 
Integrity .05 .05 .07 .95 .34 
Extraversion .04 .04 .08 1.02 .31 
Agreeableness .08 .05 .15 1.77 .08 
Conscientiousness .10 .04 .18 2.36 .02* 
Emotional Stability -.10 .04 -.19 -2.55 .01* 
Openness to Experience -.02 .05 -.03 -.35 .73 
R = .31, R2 = .10, Adjusted R2 = .07, F (7, 222) = 3.36, p = .01** 
 
Model 2: DV: Numerical Reasoning difference (ND) 
Variables B SE B β t p 
Constant -.71 1.56  -.45 .65 
Undergraduate GPA -.30 .29 -.07 -1.03 .31 
Integrity .06 .03 .13 1.71 .09 
Extraversion .01 .02 .03 .32 .75 
Agreeableness .04 .03 .10 1.18 .24 
Conscientiousness -.00 .03 -.01 -.09 .93 
Emotional Stability -.07 .03 -.19 -2.52 .01* 
Openness to Experience .01 .03 .03 .36 .72 
R = .22, R2 = .05, Adjusted R2 = .02, F (7, 222) = 1.67, p = .12 
 
Model 3: DV: Verbal Reasoning difference (VD) 
Variables B SE B β t p 
Constant -3.98 1.73  -2.31 .02* 
Undergraduate GPA .06 .32 .01 .18 .86 
Integrity -.01 .04 -.01 -.19 .85 
Extraversion .03 .03 .09 1.16 .25 
Agreeableness .05 .03 .12 1.44 .15 
Conscientiousness .11 .03 .26 3.42 .00* 
Emotional Stability -.04 .03 -.10 -1.36 .18 
Openness to Experience -.03 .03 -.06 -.82 .41 
R = .32, R2 = .10, Adjusted R2 = .08, F (7, 222) = 3.46, p = .00** 
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Table 7. Regression models for the control condition 
 
Model 1: DV: General Cognitive difference (GD) 
Variables B SE B β t p 
Constant -.67 4.42  -.15 .88 
Undergraduate GPA -.39 .82 -.04 -.48 .63 
Integrity -.08 .09 -.08 -.86 .39 
Extraversion -.02 .08 -.03 -.23 .82 
Agreeableness -.01 .08 -.01 -.10 .92 
Conscientiousness .01 .08 -.01 -.14 .89 
Emotional Stability .01 .06 .02 .21 .84 
Openness to Experience .13 .08 .18 1.66 .10 
R = .17, R2 = .03, Adjusted R2 = -.02, F (7, 145) = .59, p = .77 
 
Model 2: DV: Numerical Reasoning difference (ND) 
Variables B SE B β t p 
Constant 3.34 3.58  .93 .35 
Undergraduate GPA -.74 .66 -.09 -1.11 .27 
Integrity -.01 .08 -.02 -.17 .86 
Extraversion -.07 .06 -.12 -1.01 .28 
Agreeableness .01 .06 .01 .12 .90 
Conscientiousness -.04 .07 -.05 -.55 .59 
Emotional Stability -.02 .05 -.04 -.46 .65 
Openness to Experience .09 .07 .15 1.41 .16 
R = .17, R2 = .03, Adjusted R2 = -.02, F (7, 145) = .64, p = .72 
 
Model 3: DV: Verbal Reasoning difference (VD) 
Variables B SE B β t p 
Constant -4.01 3.40  -1.18 .24 
Undergraduate GPA .35 .63 .05 .55 .69 
Integrity -.07 .07 -.08 -.93 .35 
Extraversion .05 .06 .09 .85 .40 
Agreeableness -.02 .06 -.03 -.26 .80 
Conscientiousness .02 .06 .04 .39 .69 
Emotional Stability .03 .05 .07 .75 .46 
Openness to Experience .04 .06 .07 .68 .50 
R = .19, R2 = .04, Adjusted R2 = -.01, F (7, 145) = .77, p = .62 
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Table 8. Correlations for the experimental and control groups combined. 
 
 1. GD 2. ND 3. VD 4. GPA 5. INT 6. EXT 7. AGR 8. CON 9. EMO 10. OPE 
1. General Cognitive 
difference (GD) -          
2. Numerical Reasoning 
difference (ND) .67** -         
3. Verbal Reasoning 
difference (VD) .69** -.07 -        
4. Undergraduate GPA 
(GPA) -.00 -.08 .07 -       
5. Integrity (INT) 
 .08 .05 .06 .09 -      
6. Extraversion (EXT) 
 .10* -.00 .14** .05 .30** -     
7. Agreeableness (AGR) 
 .12* .03 .14** .03 .32** .50** -    
8. Conscientiousness 
(CON) .12* -.02 .19** .17** .36** .31** .49** -   
9. Emotional Stability 
(EMO) -.00 -.07 .06 .06 .23** .32** .35** .26** -  
10. Openness to 
Experience (OPE) .12* .05 .11* .08 .26** .52** .48** .36** .29** - 
Note. Sample correlations (N = 400). * p < .05, ** p < .01
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Table 9. Regression models for the experimental and control groups combined 
 
Model 1: DV: General Cognitive difference (GD) 
Variables B SE B β t p 
Constant -2.85 2.25  -1.27 .21 
Undergraduate GPA -.25 .42 -.03 -.60 .55 
Integrity .01 .05 .01 .25 .81 
Extraversion .02 .04 .04 .62 .53 
Agreeableness .03 .04 .05 .69 .49 
Conscientiousness .05 .04 .07 1.20 .23 
Emotional Stability -.04 .03 -.07 -1.21 .12 
Openness to Experience .04 .04 .06 1.03 .30 
Group Membership -1.26 .40 -.16 -3.14 .00* 
R = .23, R2 = .05, Adjusted R2 = .03, F (8, 391) = 2.77, p = .01 
 
Model 2: DV: Numerical Reasoning difference (ND) 
Variables B SE B β t p 
Constant .79 1.65  .48 .63 
Undergraduate GPA -.46 .31 -.08 -1.51 .13 
Integrity .04 .03 .06 1.17 .25 
Extraversion .02 .03 -.04 -.61 .54 
Agreeableness .02 .03 .04 .63 .53 
Conscientiousness -.02 .03 -.05 -.80 .42 
Emotional Stability -.04 .03 -.09 -1.66 .10 
Openness to Experience .04 .03 .08 1.31 .19 
Group Membership .35 .29 -.06 -1.21 .23 
R = .16, R2 = .03, Adjusted R2 = .01, F (8, 391) = 1.29, p = .25 
 
Model 3: DV: Verbal Reasoning difference (VD) 
Variables B SE B β t p 
Constant -3.65 1.67  -2.20 .03* 
Undergraduate GPA .21 .31 .04 .69 .49 
Integrity -.03 .03 -.05 -.83 .41 
Extraversion .04 .03 .09 1.46 .15 
Agreeableness .01 .03 .02 .31 .76 
Conscientiousness .07 .03 .14 2.43 .02* 
Emotional Stability .00 .03 .00 .02 .99 
Openness to Experience .00 .03 .01 .10 .92 
Group Membership -.90 .30 -.15 -3.06 .00* 
R = .26, R2 = .07, Adjusted R2 = .05, F (8, 391) = 3.53, p = .00 
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A. Review of test coaching in academic setting1 
 Test coaching has been frequently studied in academic settings, and there have 
been several studies on the effects of coaching on Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores. 
However, many empirical studies on SAT coaching are flawed methodologically 
(Messick & Jungeblut, 1981). For example, in nonrandomized studies, there is no way to 
adjust for selection bias, student motivation, and small samples of coached students. But 
for studies with control groups, after weighting each by experimental sample size, 
Messick and Jungeblut found an average test coaching effect of 14.3 points for verbal 
(SAT-V) and 15.1 points for mathematical (SAT-M) portions. 
While Messick and Jungeblut used rank order correlation procedures to combine 
studies with and without control groups, DerSimonian and Laird (1983) used a random 
effects approach to estimate the overall coaching effect in different situations. In their 
meta-analysis, they defined “points gained” as the difference in improvement between 
coached and uncoached groups. In their random effects approach, they parceled out the 
observed coaching effect for each study into two independent components, the true gain, 
and the sampling error. They proposed three different models to examine treatment 
effects. Model 1 assumes the sampling errors are independent and normally distributed, 
which ignores any dependence or covariance of one coaching program on another. As 
several coaching studies were actually conducted by the same investigator, Model 2 
considers the true gain in terms of program effect and study effect. Model 3 separates 
uncontrolled, unrandomized evaluations from controlled, and matched or randomized 
                                                 
1 Note that in this literature, general coaching refers to training on the broad constructs assessed by a test, 
rather than providing specific information about items on tests. Thus, in this section, the term “test 
coaching” is used to mean general training on broad constructs, not on specific item preknowledge given in 
item sharing. 
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studies. Based on the Model 1, they found the overall coaching effect was about 22 points 
for both verbal and math scores, with large estimated variances (477 for the verbal and 
282 for the mathematical scores). When the correlations between studies were 
considered, Model 2 showed the average program effect was about 3 to 4 points lower 
than the results obtained from Model 1. In Model 3 where the effect of the evaluation 
design was considered, the matched and randomized studies showed mean gains of about 
10 points for each of the SAT exams. Controlled studies showed mean gains of 15 points, 
while uncontrolled studies showed mean gains of 40 and 54 points for verbal and 
mathematic scores. Considering the three models, they concluded that on average, there 
is a positive score gain in general test coaching, but the variance across studies is large 
due to the evaluation design. 
Kulik, Bangert-Drowns, and Kulik (1984) examined the effectiveness of coaching 
on several aptitude tests. With regards to the general coaching effect for the SAT, they 
found coaching raised scores from pretest to posttest about 0.36 standard deviations for 
the experimental groups and 0.21 standard deviations for the control groups. They 
concluded that the effect of coaching alone on the SAT was an average of 0.15 standard 
deviations. 
Another approach to examining general test coaching effect on the SAT is to 
compare test preparation or test practice effects in terms of item characteristics, such as 
item format, difficulty level, and complexity of test directions. Powers (1986) used two 
raters to determine the complexity of directions or task. For instance, antonyms items that 
ask test takers to choose the option that has the opposite word or phrase as the stem have 
the lowest rating of complexity in their study. After reviewing five within-test practice 
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studies (27 effect sizes) and five test preparation studies (15 effect sizes), Powers found 
the effect sizes for the test preparation studies were generally larger than the within-test 
practice effect. He found length of directions and complexity of test directions were 
strongly correlated, where test preparation studies had higher correlations than within-test 
practice studies. He concluded that complex item formats are more susceptible to 
coaching, practice, or test preparation than simpler formats. 
In another study, Becker (1990) conducted a meta-analysis using a standardized 
mean-change measure with a generalized least square analysis for published (academic 
journal articles only) and unpublished studies of coaching for the SAT. Regardless of 
study design, she found the coaching effects for the SAT-M are consistently larger than 
those for the SAT-V. When only published studies with control groups were used, she 
found the overall coaching effect was 0.09 standard deviations on the SAT-V (8 points) 
and 0.16 on the SAT-M (19 points). 
But Becker’s (1990) meta-analysis was criticized by Briggs (2005). He argued 
that using published studies with control groups is problematic when it comes to 
predicting the results from new studies. Using 16 new coaching reports after Becker’s 
meta-analysis was published, he found the predicted test coaching effect for the SAT-V 
ranges from 17.4 to 27.7 points, and from 13.6 to 28.6 points for the SAT-M. He 
suggested that if no treatment and study design characteristics are considered, the 
expected predictions of the SAT-V coaching effects to be about 17 points, and 29 points 
for the SAT-M. Therefore, he argued that because Becker’s meta-analysis can be 
criticized for how studies were quantified, a narrative review may be more informative. 
Indeed, what Briggs proposed was reflected in Powers’s (1993) review. He 
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reviewed meta-analyses conducted by Messick and Jungeblut (1981), DerSimonian and 
Laird (1983), Kulik, Bangert-Drowns, and Kulik (1984), and Becker (1990), and 
summarized the findings from the four meta-analyses by concluding that the effect of 
general test coaching is about 15 to 25 points each on the verbal and the mathematical 
portions of the SAT. Using a recent dataset from the College Board, he concluded that in 
general there is a 10 points increase for the SAT-V and 20 points improvement for the 
SAT-M, and these score increases add little improvement to a “typical” test taker’s 
standing. That is, for a typical test taker who has SAT-V of 420 and SAT-M of 470, such 
score increases will only push the test taker’s standing from the 48th to the 53rd percentile 
rank on the SAT-V, and from the 48th to the 54th percentile rank on the SAT-M. At higher 
and lower score levels, the same score increases change can be only 1% and effect little 
change to one’s standing. 
 Although the above review shows that general test coaching affects the scores and 
rankings of test takers, predictive validity seems to be uninfluenced. Allalouf and Ben-
Shakhar (1998) randomly assigned participants into coached and uncoached groups to 
take an Israeli Psychometric Entrance Test, an aptitude test similar to the SAT. They 
found larger effects for the quantitative test scores (27% of a standard deviation) than 
with the verbal test scores (18% of a standard deviation), which is consistent with what 
was found in the above mentioned meta-analysis studies. While they found general test 
coaching enhanced scores on the SAT-like test, it did not decrease the predictive validity 
of the test. On the contrary, the predictive validities of the after-coaching scores were 
slightly higher for both coached and uncoached groups, although not statistically 
significant. They concluded that test coaching had little effect on predictive validity, and 
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general test coaching did not create a prediction bias against coached or uncoached 
students. 
 To sum up, when general test coaching is considered in the context of the SAT, it 
seems that there is a 10 to 20 points gain for each of the verbal and mathematical 
subtests. On average, test coaching had a larger effect for the mathematical section than 
for the verbal section. However, in a simulated employee selection situation, will we find 
similar results on specific test coaching, that is, item sharing? We need to first look at 
how testing is different in educational and occupational settings. More importantly, we 
need to consider whether general test coaching in educational settings (i.e., training on 
broad constructs) is different from specific item sharing in employment testing (i.e., 
benefiting from item preknowledge). 
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B. Test preparation and test coaching 
It should be noted that test preparation is not the same as test coaching. In an 
article on test preparation activities and employment test performance (Clause et al., 
2001), researchers examined the relationship among motivational factors, metacognition 
and learning strategies, and employment test scores. Participants were given test 
preparation materials about the nature of the test they would be taking and a procedural 
manual for the job of state police, and two weeks later their test performance was 
evaluated using a video-based procedures test. While they found self-efficacy and 
motivation had effects on test performance through metacognitive processes and learning 
strategies applicants used to prepare for the test, the study was unable to answer how such 
test preparation activities effected test scores. As prior knowledge of the applicant about 
the job was not collected (e.g., they might have previous experience with similar 
procedure manuals), it would be difficult to link test preparation to score improvement in 
this setting. 
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C. Informed consent 
Informed Consent 
Please read this consent agreement carefully. You must be 18 years old or older to participate. 
Purpose of the research:  
This research is being conducted by Ben-Roy Do of the Department of Psychology at the University 
of Illinois under the direction of Dr. Fritz Drasgow. The purpose of this research is to assess how 
test coaching may effect types of items.  
What you will do in this study:  
You will be asked to respond to Questionnaire 1 and Exercise 1, exchange information about the 
exercise, and then take Exercise 2, and respond to a short Questionnaire 2.  
Risks:  
There are no anticipated risks, beyond those encountered in daily life, associated with participating in 
this study. .  
Compensation: 
The study will take under 50 minutes to complete. You will receive 1 Psychology 100 course credit (1 
hour credit) for participating in this study. At the end of the study, you will receive an explanation of 
the study and the hypotheses. We hope that you will learn a little bit about how psychological 
research is conducted.  
Voluntary Withdrawal:  
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study at any 
time without penalty (however, you will not receive Psych 100 credit for this study). You may skip 
over any questions or procedures, or you may withdraw by informing the research associate that you 
no longer wish to participate (no questions will be asked). Your decision to participate, decline, or 
withdraw participation will have no effect on your status at or relationship with the University of 
Illinois.  
Confidentiality:  
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Your participation in this study will remain confidential, and your identity will not be stored with 
your data. Your responses will be assigned a code number that is not linked to your name or other 
identifying information. All data and consent forms will be stored in a locked room. Results of this 
study may be presented at conferences and/or published in books, journals, and/or in the popular 
media.  
Further information:  
If you have questions about this study, please contact Fritz Drasgow, Department of Psychology, 
University of Illinois, Champaign, IL 61820. Email:fdrasgow@s.psych.uiuc.edu; phone: (217)333-
2739.  
Who to contact about your rights in this study:  
If you have any concerns about this study or your experience as a participant, you may contact the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at UIUC at (217) 333-2670 (collect calls will be accepted if you 
state you are a study participant); email: irb@uiuc.edu  
Agreement:  
The purpose and nature of this research have been sufficiently explained and I agree to participate in 
this study. I understand that I am free to withdraw at any time without incurring any penalty. I 
understand that I will receive a copy of this form to take with me.  
Signature: ________________________________ Date: __________________  
Name (print): _____________________________ IRB-approved template, 12-29-2005 
 104 
D. Introductory Direction 
 
You will be asked to complete a 3-minute Questionnaire 1 about a recent team 
project you had to work on with your classmates or coworkers. 
Then, you will be asked to spend about 17 minutes on the Exercise 1. Please try 
your best to perform well and answer all of the questions. If you finish the Exercise 1 
before the 20 minutes mark, please wait for researcher announcement. 
Afterwards, you will spend 5 minutes information exchange to talk about the test 
content you just took in the first-stage selection exercise. You will receive further 
instruction later. 
When you finish the information exchange, you will spend about 20 minutes on 
the Exercise 2. This time, we ask you to circle the items if you think the information was 
exchanged to you. Again, please try your best to perform well and answer all of the 
questions.  
If you finish the Exercise 2, you may proceed with a short Questionnaire 2, 
which will take less than 3 minutes to complete the last part of the experiment. The 
experiment will take no more than 50 minutes of your time, and you will receive a full 
hour’s credit for your participation. 
If you have any questions about what you will be doing, feel free to ask now or 
whenever they arise. For further information about the experiment, you may contact: 
Ben-Roy Do at 333-9631, benroydo@s.psych.uiuc.edu, or  
Dr. Fritz Drasgow at 333-2739, fdrasgow@s.psych.uiuc.edu.  
 105 
E. Questionnaire 1 
Please write a number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with that statement. 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
a little 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Agree 
a little 
Agree 
strongly 
1 2 3 4 5 
Think about a recent team project you had to work on with your classmates or 
coworkers. In general, I see Myself as Someone Who... 
___ 1. Am trusted to keep secrets. 
___ 2. Keep my promises. 
___ 3. Believe that honesty is the basis for trust. 
___ 4. Can be trusted to keep my promises. 
___ 5. Am true to my own values. 
___ 6. Lie to get myself out of trouble. 
___ 7. Am hard to understand. 
___ 8. Feel like an imposter. 
___ 9. Like to exaggerate my troubles. 
Please continue to work on the Exercise 1. 
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F. Verbal Reasoning 
 
Each item consists of a pair of words that are related to one another. From a set of five 
additional pairs of words, please select the pair that best expresses the relationship 
conveyed by the original pair. Note: The order of the words in the pairs is significant!  
 
Q1. diving : water 
a) surfing : swimming 
b) fly : bird 
c) snow : skiing 
d) parachuting : air 
e) sand : building 
 
Q2. depressed : cheerful 
a) sad : melancholy 
b) doctor : pain 
c) angry : calm 
d) blue : sky 
e) singing : smiling 
 
Q3. wings : bees 
a) dog : legs 
b) driven : car 
c) birds : wings 
d) fins : fish 
e) honey : sweet 
 
Q4. surf : water  
a) island : land 
b) waves : boat 
c) glide : air 
d) ice : skate 
e) storm : climate 
 
Q5. fuel : bus 
a) fire : wood 
b) coal : plane 
c) sun : tree 
d) wind : kite 
e) water : boat 
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Q6. silver : gold 
a) diamond : glass 
b) whiskey : alcohol 
c) glass : crystal 
d) coal : wood 
e) concrete : stone 
 
Q7. water : plant  
a) body : food 
b) engine : fuel 
c) cake : diet 
d) petrol : car 
e) table : wood 
 
Q8. sugar : caramel 
a) water : ice 
b) mould : bread 
c) milk : cheese 
d) butter : cream 
e) vegetable : salad 
 
Q9. oxygen : water 
a) juice : sugar 
b) water : ice 
c) word : letter 
d) forest : tree 
e) alcohol : beer 
 
Q10. wind : clock 
a) weigh : kilogram 
b) violin : tune 
c) fly : bird 
d) sharpen : pencil 
e) cold : water 
 
Q11. waitress : restaurant 
a) clinic : doctor 
b) teacher : class 
c) receptionist : hotel 
d) bank : clerk 
e) farmer : ranch 
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Q12. clothing : skirt 
a) smile : laugh 
b) noodles : food 
c) music : melody 
d) mammal : monkey 
e) fish : dolphin 
 
Q13. sentence : word  
a) text : book 
b) snow : ice 
c) atmosphere : gas 
d) mist : cloud 
e) liquid : oxygen 
 
Q14. shovel : pitchfork 
a) pen : paper 
b) plate : knife 
c) spoon : fork 
d) broomstick : brush 
e) butter : milk 
 
Q15. warm : hot  
a) storm : drizzle 
b) snow : cold 
c) frost : chill 
d) hill : mountain 
e) boulder : pebble 
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G. Numerical Reasoning 
 
In each item of the assessment, you will find a series of numbers arranged according to a 
certain rule. From a set of 5 possible options, your task is to choose the option whose 
corresponding number best continues the series.  
 
Q1.  2, 5, 11, 20, 32, 47, 65 ... 
a) 68 
b) 71 
c) 74 
d) 75 
e) 86 
 
Q2.  32,  16,  19,  20,  10,  13,  14   ... 
a) 7 
b) 14 
c) 15 
d) 17 
e) 28 
 
Q3.  47, 38, 30, 23, 17, 12, 8 ... 
a) 4 
b) 5 
c) 6 
d) 7 
e) 8 
 
Q4.  75, 72, 24, 27, 9, 6, 2 ... 
a) 2 
b) 5 
c) 9 
d) 12 
e) 18 
 
Q5.  3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13, 17 ... 
a) 18 
b) 20 
c) 22 
d) 24 
e) 25 
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Q6.  1,  2,  5,  11,  12,  15,  21 ... 
a) 22 
b) 24 
c) 25 
d) 27 
e) 30 
 
Q7.  19, 91, 18, 81, 17, 71, 16 ... 
a) 14 
b) 15 
c) 61 
d) 71 
e) 81 
 
Q8.  2, 5, 15, 18, 54, 57, 171 ... 
a) 173 
b) 174 
c) 176 
d) 178 
e) 180 
 
Q9.  42,    45,    15,    18,    6,    9,    3   ... 
a) 0 
b) 3 
c) 6 
d) 9 
e) 12 
 
Q10.  36, 12, 16, 18, 6, 10, 12 ... 
a) 3 
b) 4 
c) 10 
d) 12 
e) 14 
 
Q11.  3, 6, 10, 15, 21, 28, 36 ... 
a) 36 
b) 37 
c) 39 
d) 42 
e) 45 
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Q12.  44, 48, 12, 16, 4, 8, 2 ... 
a) 0 
b) 2 
c) 4 
d) 6 
e) 8 
 
Q13.  9, 1, 10, 2, 11, 3, 12 ... 
a) 3 
b) 4 
c) 5 
d) 14 
e) 15 
 
Q14.  10,  30,   32,  16,  48,  50,  25   ... 
a) 27 
b) 40 
c) 50 
d) 75 
e) 99 
 
Q15.  14,  11,  15,  16,  13,  17,  18   ... 
a) 15 
b) 19 
c) 22 
d) 23 
e) 36 
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H. Personality Inventory 
On the following page, there are phrases describing people's behaviors. Please use the 
rating scale below to describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe 
yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself 
as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you 
are, and roughly your same age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, 
your responses will be kept in absolute confidence. Please read each statement carefully, 
and then write a number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree 
or disagree with that statement. 
 
Response Options 
Disagree 
strongly  
Disagree  
a little 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Agree  
a little 
Agree 
strongly 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
___ 1. Am the life of the party. 
___ 2. Feel little concern for others. 
___ 3. Am always prepared. 
___ 4. Get stressed out easily. 
___ 5. Have a rich vocabulary. 
___ 6. Don't talk a lot. 
___ 7. Am interested in people.  
___ 8. Leave my belongings around. 
___ 9. Am relaxed most of the time. 
___ 10. Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas. 
___ 11. Feel comfortable around people.  
___ 12. Insult people. 
___ 13. Pay attention to details. 
___ 14. Worry about things. 
___ 15. Have a vivid imagination. 
___ 16. Keep in the background. 
___ 17. Sympathize with others' feelings 
___ 18. Make a mess of things. 
___ 19. Seldom feel blue. 
___ 20. Am not interested in abstract ideas. 
___ 21. Start conversations. 
___ 22. Am not interested in other people's problems. 
___ 23. Get chores done right away.  
___ 24. Am easily disturbed.  
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___ 25. Have excellent ideas. 
___ 26. Have little to say. 
___ 27. Have a soft heart. 
___ 28. Often forget to put things back in the proper place.
___ 29. Get upset easily. 
___ 30. Do not have a good imagination. 
___ 31. Talk to a lot of different people at parties 
___ 32. Am not really interested in others. 
___ 33. Like order. 
___ 34. Change my mood a lot. 
___ 35. Am quick to understand things. 
___ 36. Don't like to draw attention to myself. 
___ 37. Take time out for others. 
___ 38. Shirk my duties. 
___ 39. Have frequent mood swings. 
___ 40. Use difficult words. 
___ 41. Don't mind being the center of attention. 
___ 42. Feel others' emotions. 
___ 43. Follow a schedule. 
___ 44. Get irritated easily. 
___ 45. Spend time reflecting on things. 
___ 46. Am quiet around strangers. 
___ 47. Make people feel at ease. 
___ 48. Am exacting in my work. 
___ 49. Often feel blue. 
___ 50. Am full of ideas. 
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I. Direction at the End of the Exercise 1 
 
Now that you have finished the Exercise 1, we would like you to talk about the 
test content to your fellow classmates. Please notify the researcher and s/he will assist 
you to locate your team member. 
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J. Direction for Information Exchange 
 
Now you have one or two fellow students in your group, we ask you to try your 
best to recall any information that may help other students to do well on the test you 
just took.  
The information exchange will take about 5 minutes. During the process, you will: 
1) Talk about questions and answers appeared on the Exercise 1 you just took. 
2) Listen to your fellow students talk about information on the test they just took, which 
will become your Exercise 2. 
 Please do not ask your fellow students to clarify what items were provided on 
the test. If every member in your group has exchanged test information, Please notify the 
researcher, and s/he will give you the packet for the second-stage selection exercise. 
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K. Direction for Exercise 2 
 
Now you will spend about 20 minutes on the Exercise 2. This time, we ask you to 
circle the items if you think the information was exchanged to you. Again, please try 
your best to perform well and answer all of the questions.  
If you finish the Exercise 2, you may proceed with a short Questionnaire 2, 
which will take less than 3 minutes to complete the last part of the experiment.
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L. Questionnaire 2 
 
Thank you for completing the Exercise 2. As a final part of the study, we would like you 
to answer the following questions about yourself and your approach to the study. Please 
answer honestly and candid. 
  Strongly Disagree    
Strongly 
Agree 
1 I was very motivated to disclose the information in the first stage exercise. 1 2 3 4 5 
2 I actively participated in the information exchange. 1 2 3 4 5 
3 I believe that I did as well as most people who took this test. 1 2 3 4 5 
4 I am good at taking this kind of test.  1 2 3 4 5 
5 I think that this test was difficult.  1 2 3 4 5 
6 
I think the information exchange is 
helpful. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 I think the information exchange provide accurate answer to the question. 1 2 3 4 5 
8 
I am more confident about my 
performance after the information 
exchange. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9 
The quality of information exchange was 
high. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
10 The information exchanged was very helpful for the second stage exercise. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
11 What is your undergraduate GPA (estimation is fine)?  
12 What was your high school GPA?  
13 What was your overall ACT score?  
14 What was your SAT verbal score?  
15 What was your SAT math score?  
16 What is your gender? Male  Female 
17 What is your ethnic background? 
a. White (Caucasian)    d. Asian/Pacific Islander 
b. Black (African American)   e. Native American (Aleutian/American 
Indian) 
c. Hispanic     f. Other 
Thank you for your participation in our study. Please return all materials to the 
researcher. Thanks! 
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M. Debriefing 
Debriefing 
Thank you for your participation in our study on Test Coaching. As you know, 
testing can have a large and significant impact on the lives of many people. For example, 
many of you may have already taken the SAT or ACT as a pre-requisite for admissions 
into college. An important concern in testing has been to preserve the validity of such 
tests. As such, researchers have been concerned how test coaching may influence test 
results. 
In the experiment you just participated in, you first took Exercise 1, exchanged 
information about the test, and then took Exercise 2. Your performance will be used to 
evaluate what types of items are most likely to be exchanged during test coaching process, 
and how likely your score may be influenced by the process. 
There has not been any published research regarding this issue, consequently we 
are unable to direct you to any publications regarding this issue. This is an exploratory 
research project and therefore we do not know what types of items are more likely to be 
remembered. We hope that your participation will help us better understand the types of 
items that are most memorable. If you have any questions or comments about this work, 
feel free to contact Ben-Roy Do at benroydo@s.psych.uiuc.edu. 
 
Again, thank you very much for your participation! 
 
